

Hungary
Parliamentary Elections 2026
Report by
Liberty Coalition for Free and a Fair Election

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Table of Contents:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1. PREFACE.....	5
2. ELECTORAL SYSTEM LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....	9
2.1. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION	9
2.2. VOTING RIGHTS AND VOTER REGISTRATION	11
2.3. ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION	12
2.3.1. <i>Complaints resolved by the NVB</i>	13
2.3.2. <i>Appeals to the Kúria</i>	14
2.3.3. <i>Final Appeal: the Constitutional Court</i>	15
2.4. CONCLUSION	16
2.5. ELECTION DAY.....	17
2.6. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS	18
2.7. CONCLUSIONS.....	20
3. ELECTION FUNDING & CAMPAIGN FINANCE.....	21
3.1. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL RULES REGULATING ELECTION FUNDING & CAMPAIGN FINANCE	21
3.2. IDENTIFIED CONCERNS	21
3.3. CONCLUSIONS.....	24
4. MEDIA LANDSCAPE	25
4.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK	25
4.2. THE 2013 ELECTORAL PROCEDURE ACT: MEDIA REGULATIONS DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS	26
4.3. THE AGENTS ACT, THE MEDIA, AND THE DRAFT LAW ON TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC LIFE.....	26
4.4. MEDIA REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY BODIES	27
4.5. THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION	27
4.6. THE DSA MECHANISM AND THE ROMANIAN SCENARIO	29
4.7. NARRATIVES OF POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE	30
4.8. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, PRE-ELECTION POLLS, INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS JOURNALISTS	30
4.9. ELECTORAL POLLS AND FORECASTS	31
4.10. CONCLUSIONS	33
5. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE	34
5.1. GENERAL REMARKS.....	34
5.2. RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE FOLLOWING THE 2022 ELECTIONS	34
5.3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTIONS FROM 2011 TO 2025 AS A NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR FOREIGN INTERFERENCE	36
5.4. MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE BY RUSSIAN OR UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.....	39
5.5. STATEMENTS BY HIGH-RANKING EUROPEAN UNION OFFICIALS CONSTITUTING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE	41
5.6. CONCLUSIONS.....	43
6. LIBERTY COALITION FOR FREE AND A FAIR ELECTION	45

Executive Summary

In an interconnected world of competing financial interests, political power, and cultural values, elections are no longer confined to national borders. What was once a domestic process now operates within a broader arena of international actors, borderless digital infrastructure, and rival narratives about legitimacy.

Hungary's 2026 election must be understood in that arena: not simply as a national political contest, but as a case study in how sovereignty itself can be tested and challenged in the modern era.

To that end, this report focuses on four key areas of the electoral system: the legal framework, campaign finance, media landscape, and potential foreign interference.

Legal Framework

Following a comprehensive inquiry and direct observation on 12 April 2026 at 60 polling locations on election day, the LCFFE concludes that Hungary's 2026 parliamentary elections complied with all applicable national and international standards, ensuring universal, direct, secret, free, and equal voting.

No circumstances were observed on election day that violated the principles of fair and free expression of the will of the voters. No changes to the electoral law in the past year undermined the system's stability or the principle of equality of opportunity to vote. The electoral framework upholds pluralism, stability, free expression, neutrality, and effective dispute resolution.

Hungary's long-established electoral legal framework is not a significant source of controversy and is broadly accepted across the political spectrum. Its credibility rests on 36 years of national elections every four years, followed by peaceful transitions of power.

The system is designed to ensure a stable government with a strong parliamentary majority for the winner, while incorporating proportional representation for smaller parties and national minorities.

Electoral regulations provide relatively accessible entry conditions for new political actors, including low thresholds for candidate registration in single-mandate districts and manageable requirements for national party lists. Public funding extends to newly formed parties, such as TISZA, without prior parliamentary representation.

Campaign Funding

Based on its review of regulations and documentation, as well as interviews, the LCFFE concludes that Hungary's electoral financing system is broadly aligned with the European framework and shows no substantive structural deviations.

The system rests on a formally robust framework combining public funding, restricted private donations, and institutional oversight. However, its effectiveness is limited by insufficient real-time transparency and the growing complexity of digital and indirect financing channels, which undermine bans on political digital advertising and foreign campaign funding.

Concerns also arise from foreign and international actors (e.g., the European Commission, USAID, and the National Endowment for Democracy) providing grants to NGOs, political activists, and media entities that often align politically with the funders but operate outside the formal campaign finance regime.

Media Landscape

The Hungarian media environment is formally pluralistic, supported by constitutional guarantees of press freedom and comprehensive regulatory provisions. In practice, it remains highly polarized, with state-supported public media, significant commercial actors, and ownership structures largely divided along political lines.

The digital media sphere is fragmented and expanding, shaped by platform governance, disinformation risks, and declining public trust.

With 65% of Hungarians relying on digital media for their news, concerns were raised regarding the application of the EU Digital Services Act, particularly the use of the Rapid Response System during the electoral period. Non-state “trusted fact-checkers” and “flaggers” are deployed by the European Commission as part of the European Democracy Shield to regulate content.

Foreign Interference

The elections occurred amid external influence from both state and non-state international actors, reflecting Hungary’s broader geopolitical and ideological context.

While the ruling Fidesz–KDNP alliance received explicit endorsement from certain foreign political leaders, the TISZA party benefited from measures linked to EU institutions and international non-state networks that operated to its indirect advantage—including institutional criticism and European Parliament resolutions targeting Fidesz, withholding of EU funds, exclusion from EU research programs, limiting political speech through the Rapid Response System.

Additional concerns involve reported incidents suggesting possible foreign intelligence service involvement in domestic politics, including the dissemination of recorded communications of government officials through politically engaged actors posing as investigative journalists.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding these external pressures and the complex informational and geopolitical environment, the LCFFE finds that the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections process ensured the genuine expression of the will of the people and overall met the standards of free and fair elections.

1. Preface

In an interconnected world of competing financial interests, political power, and cultural values, elections are no longer confined to national borders. What once unfolded primarily through domestic institutions—candidates, ballots, observers, and courts—now operates within a broader arena shaped by international actors, digital infrastructure without borders, and competing narratives about legitimacy. Hungary’s election must be understood in that context: not simply as a national political contest, but as a case study in how sovereignty itself can be tested and challenged in the modern era.

At its core, Hungary maintains a structured electoral system grounded in constitutional order. Its mixed model of representation, clear administrative bodies, and layered judicial review mechanisms reflect a system designed to be transparent and rules-based. Safeguards such as restrictions on foreign funding, public registration processes, and verifiable vote counting procedures reinforce the integrity of the process as formally constructed.

Yet the question confronting Hungary is not only how elections are conducted—but how the process and its results are perceived.

In recent years, a growing tension has emerged between domestic electoral processes and external influence. Hungarian law has long prohibited foreign financing of political parties, reflecting the foundational principle of sovereignty. However, evolving mechanisms of influence—particularly through non-governmental organizations, media networks, digital platforms, and international institutions regulating free expression—have complicated the distinction between legal domestic political activity and illicit external engagement.

Institutions such as the European Commission, funding channels associated with entities such as USAID or the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and legal measures designed to monitor political speech under the Digital Services Act, including the European Democracy Shield and Rapid Response System, have been cited in ongoing debates about the role of international actors in shaping political environments within European member states. While such mechanisms are often framed as supporting democratic values, they have also raised concerns about whether they function, in practice, as tools of political pressure—particularly when funding, regulatory frameworks, and public messaging influence domestic discourse.

Hungary’s response has included the creation of a sovereignty protection framework—an institutional acknowledgment that foreign influence is no longer limited to overt financial contributions, but can operate through information systems, training networks, and narrative construction. These developments reflect a broader global shift: elections are increasingly shaped not only by voters, but by the transnational environments in which those voters receive information.

Central to this dynamic is the role of digital platforms. Social media ecosystems, particularly those dominated by large-scale networks, have become primary channels through which political narratives are created, amplified, or contested. Efforts to regulate content—whether through European digital services frameworks or partnerships with third-party organizations—have introduced new mechanisms for flagging, reviewing, and in some cases curtailing political speech. The lack of transparency surrounding these interventions—both who initiates them and by what standards they will be judged—has contributed to concerns about the process and potential bias.

At the same time, narratives about election legitimacy are often formed well before votes are cast. In Hungary, the characterization of elections as “free but not fair” has gained traction in certain international and media circles. This framing—while presented as analytical—has the practical effect of shaping expectations in advance of outcomes. Should the result favor the incumbent government, the moral groundwork for contesting legitimacy is already in place.

This pattern is not unique to Hungary. In Romania, electoral outcomes have been subject to unprecedented post-election challenges, including calls for reexamination despite the absence of confirmed external interference. In the United States, competing narratives surrounding election integrity have had lasting effects—not only on public trust, but on the ability of the elected to govern. In each case, the question is not simply whether an election was conducted properly, but whether its outcome is accepted as legitimate.

The implications of this shift are profound. When legitimacy becomes contingent on the subjective narrative framing rather than the objective integrity of the process, the credibility of electoral outcomes is weakened—regardless of the underlying procedures.

Within Hungary, these pressures intersect with a political landscape marked by both continuity and disruption. While new political actors have emerged, questions persist about whether they represent substantive change or a reconfiguration of existing power structures. At the same time, opposition movements have increasingly relied on high-visibility tactics—rhetorical escalation, confrontational events, and, in some instances, physical altercations involving political figures.

Reports of journalists being denied access to rallies or subject to hostility further underscore the strain placed on institutions traditionally responsible for informing the public. Such developments reflect a broader challenge: when political competition shifts from policy to performance, the substance of governance can become secondary to the mechanics of gaining attention and shaping perception.

These dynamics are unfolding against a backdrop of significant geopolitical tension. Hungary’s position within the European Union, its approach to the war in Ukraine, and its economic relationships outside Europe all contribute to its overall strategic posture. Decisions about energy, trade, and security are not made in isolation; they are interpreted through the lens of alliance, alignment, and independence.

For Hungary, this creates dual pressure: to remain engaged within broader European structures while maintaining the ability to pursue national priorities. It is within this space that debates over sovereignty become most pronounced. Efforts by supranational bodies to influence policy direction—whether through funding mechanisms, regulatory tools, or political signaling—raise fundamental questions about the balance between cooperation and autonomy.

The Hungarian election, therefore, is not only about selecting a government. It is about defining the boundaries of national decision-making in an environment where those boundaries are increasingly contested.

At the same time, the mechanics of the election itself remain intact. Votes are cast, counted, and certified through established procedures. Legal challenges are adjudicated within defined timelines. The system functions as designed. And yet, the broader environment in which it operates introduces variables that cannot be addressed solely through institutional safeguards.

This tension—between procedural integrity and perceived legitimacy—now defines Hungary’s election. A model seen in other sovereignty-focused nations appears to be taking hold: the mechanics of voting remain intact, yet legitimacy is contested through narrative framing—before and after ballots are cast. Hungary’s position within Europe—particularly its divergence from the prevailing European Union consensus on immigration and the war in Ukraine—has placed it squarely at the center of this dynamic. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, that position is clear and consistent. A change in leadership, however, points to a markedly different trajectory—one defined less by policy than by promise.

This dynamic is reflected in the work of sovereignty-focused institutions monitoring external influence. Hungary’s electoral authorities, including the National Election Commission, maintain that direct manipulation of the vote is tightly constrained by procedural safeguards. In such a system, the more effective method is not to rig the result, but to erode confidence in it—to seed doubt, amplify speculation, and question its legitimacy.

Hungary’s 2026 contest suggests that the electoral playing field is no longer confined to the ballot box. It is shaped by domestic participation as much as by external actors, institutional pressure, and coordinated rhetoric. The stakes for Hungarian citizens are therefore twofold: not only the selection of leadership, but the preservation of trust in the electoral process itself. If this model—where legitimacy is contested through sustained narrative pressure—proves effective, it will not remain contained. It will spread.

Elections remain the democratic mechanism through which governments are chosen. But they now operate within a broader system in which media, funding, and public pressure can be used to challenge outcomes after the fact. Power, in this context, extends beyond the vote count to the interpretation of the count. In such an environment, the significance of each vote does not diminish—but the responsibility to defend it increases.

In that sense, Hungary’s 2026 election is both specific and universal. It reflects the history, values, and institutional framework of a nation that has defined its own path, while also

signaling a broader shift in democratic governance. Hungary stands as a test case—one that will determine whether electoral sovereignty can endure under sustained external pressure. The outcome will decide political leadership. But the process, and the narratives surrounding it, will shape something more enduring: public trust in the idea that elections, however contested, remain the foundation of self-government.

2. Electoral System Legal Framework

The electoral legal framework itself, which is relatively stable in Hungary, does not appear to be a significant source of controversy; the framework's main principles are generally accepted by the country's political actors.

2.1. Election Administration

Hungary is a **parliamentary democracy** in which the constitutional separation of powers is upheld.

The constitutional framework of Hungary, grounded in the Fundamental Law, reflects the aspiration of a state that—following the traumatic experiences of occupation during the Second World War and decades of control under Soviet influence, formally concluded with the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1991—has sought to reaffirm its identity, sovereignty, and capacity for democratic self-determination. In this context, Hungary's mixed electoral system—combining majoritarian and proportional elements—aims to promote **governability and political stability**, values of particular importance for a nation whose recent history has been marked by the loss of control over its own institutions. At the same time, Hungary's participation in the European Union entails a complex **balance between integration and national sovereignty**; from an electoral observation perspective, it is essential that this balance be preserved so that fundamental decisions regarding the political and electoral order remain firmly anchored in the democratic will of the Hungarian people, ensuring that the system ultimately reflects, without undue interference, the popular sovereignty at the core of democratic legitimacy.

The primary organ of popular representation is the National Assembly (*Országgyűlés*), consisting of 199 Members of Parliament.¹ Parliamentary elections are held every four years under a **single-round, mixed electoral system**.² The legislature is unicameral; its functions include law-making, the election of the Prime Minister, and the oversight of the Government.

In accordance with Hungarian public law traditions, a portion of seats is allocated in single-member constituencies. In the **106 single-member constituencies**, Members of Parliament are elected based on a relative majority. Each voter with residence in Hungary may cast a vote for one candidate. The candidate receiving the highest number of valid votes shall be elected. In delineating constituency boundaries, the National Assembly considered the requirement established by the Constitutional Court that the number of eligible voters in each constituency should differ as little as possible.

¹ Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament, section 3.

² Act CCIII of 2011, sections 11-12.

The remaining 93 mandates are distributed from national party lists. A party may submit a national list only if it has nominated candidates in at least 71 single-member constituencies, covering at least fourteen counties and the capital. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that only parties possessing broad national support and organizational presence may participate in the allocation of list mandates, thereby strengthening the national character and representativeness of the proportional component.

In the determination of results, the first step is to establish the **electoral threshold** in accordance with the proportions laid down by law. In the case of party lists, the threshold is 5 per cent of valid votes; for a joint list of two parties, 10 per cent; and for a joint list of three or more parties, 15 per cent.³

In the case of **minority lists**—covering the 13 national minorities, officially recognized in Hungary: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish, Roma, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Ukrainian—a preferential quota applies, calculated as the quotient of the total number of valid list votes and the number of list mandates to be allocated (93), and subsequently as one quarter thereof, amounting to approximately 0.27 per cent. Party and minority lists that do not reach the applicable threshold are not entitled to obtain mandates. It should be noted that national minority voters with Hungarian domicile who are enrolled in the electoral register may vote for a candidate of a single-member constituency of their domicile; their direct representation is ensured by being able to vote directly for their own national minority list in place of a party list.⁴

Mandates obtained on the basis of the preferential quota for minority lists are allocated first. Subsequently, so-called **surplus votes** are calculated and added to the list votes of parties that have reached the threshold. Surplus votes include votes cast for losing candidates in single-member constituencies, as well as surplus votes cast for winning candidates that were not necessary for victory. The surplus votes of a winning candidate are calculated by subtracting the votes obtained by the second-placed candidate from those of the winning candidate and then deducting one additional vote—the vote by which the candidate secured first place.

This sophisticated and relatively unique method, compared to electoral systems in other countries, partially compensates for the disproportionality arising from results in single-member constituencies and, due to its design, does not appear to favor any party. At the same time, it reflects the intention of the Hungarian legislature both to ensure that each vote cast has a meaningful impact on the electoral outcome and to reinforce voters' confidence that this is indeed the case.

³ Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament, Section 14.

⁴ INFORMATION for International Observers Election of Members of the National Assembly, 12 April 2026, Electoral Guidelines #231, National Election Office, Budapest 2026, p. 6.

Finally, the remaining list mandates – following the allocation of preferential mandates for minority lists – are distributed among the eligible lists using the **d’Hondt method**. Candidates subsequently obtain mandates in accordance with their position on the party list, provided they have not already secured a mandate in a single-member constituency.

Compared to the electoral systems of many democratic countries, the Hungarian electoral system appears to be **relatively open to new entrants**. The threshold for participation is comparatively low: the registration of a candidate in a single-member constituency requires only 500 supporting signatures, and once a party has registered candidates in 71 out of 106 constituencies, it becomes eligible to register a national list.

Moreover, newly established parties and candidates are entitled to public campaign funding, without the need for prior political activity or parliamentary representation. This creates opportunities to challenge the established political landscape.

The major opposition force in current elections, the TISZA Party—established in 2021 and emerging as a significant political actor since 2024—can also be seen as a beneficiary of these provisions.

2.2.Voting Rights and Voter Registration

Every Hungarian citizen of legal age is entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in parliamentary elections.⁵ Members of Parliament shall be elected based on universal and equal suffrage, by direct and secret ballot, in elections that ensure the free expression of the will of the electorate, in the manner laid down by a cardinal Act⁶.

Hungarian citizens who do not have a registered residence in Hungary may **vote by post**. This system ensures democratic participation while reflecting their legal status: they may cast a single vote, exclusively for a national party list. Without possessing a registered residence in Hungary, they are not assigned to a single-member constituency and are therefore not entitled to vote for an individual candidate. Although the system of postal voting has previously been subject to various—predominantly political—criticisms, several democratic countries in Europe and beyond employ this voting method, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court, following a thorough and substantive review, has found no legal concerns. Since its introduction in 2014, the system of postal voting has been successfully applied in four parliamentary elections and three European Parliament elections, with no substantiated irregularities identified.

⁵ Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article XXIII(1)

⁶ Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 2(1)

2.3. Electoral Dispute Resolution

The Hungarian electoral adjudication system operates through a multi-tiered structure of first-instance bodies and appeals. This structure, which aligns with applicable international standards allows for a remarkably quick response while maintaining a balance between effective protection of electoral integrity and judicial modesty—preserving the political rights of campaigners and media. Complaints are lodged initially with Constituency Electoral Commissions for localized matters, or directly with the National Electoral Commission; appeals from the former generally proceed to the National Electoral Commission, whose decisions—including those on appeals—undergo judicial review by the Kúria, with final constitutional challenges possible at the Constitutional Court. In certain instances, review may pass directly from Constituency Electoral Commissions to the Kúria in order to provide quick remedy with a stable doctrinal criterion in particularly important cases. Standing extends broadly to voters, candidates, nominating organizations, and any other affected legal persons whose rights are purportedly infringed, while limiting itself to those with direct interest in order to avoid the excessive judicialization of the political process through frivolous suits.

Procedural guarantees in this system include strict three-day filing and decision deadlines at each level, three-day Kúria review, five-day Constitutional Court review; an agility that allows the system to truly safeguard the election as a process rather than adjudicate complaints after the fact, when remedies are more difficult to guarantee. Further guarantees include collegial five-judge panels requiring majority votes, automatic case allocation with limited documented exceptions, mandatory written reasoned decisions, and publication of National Electoral Commission and Kúria rulings. These elements satisfy the short time-limits mandated by Venice Guideline II.3.3.g, as well as fulfill the multi-level appeal requirement under Venice Guideline II.3.3.a and ICCPR Article 2.3, while the final judicial tier fulfills the mandatory court appeal stipulated in Venice Guideline II.3.3.a and the effective remedy obligation in Copenhagen Document paragraph 5.10 and ICCPR Article 2.3. The system's broad authority over voting rights, eligibility, candidatures, campaign rules, and election outcomes meets Venice Guideline II.3.3.d, and annulment powers for irregularities affecting results align with Venice Guideline II.3.3.e.

Four principal criticisms emerge, however, when measured against these standards. In this section we will conduct a qualitative review of decisions at the NVB, Kúria and Constitutional Court levels in order to assess whether these criticisms give valid cause for concern. First, the law and Kúria jurisprudence confine standing to persons directly affected in their individual rights, excluding voters or citizens acting in the general public interest and most indirect claims; this is purported to contravene Venice Guideline II.3.3.c by permitting appellants or authorities to influence body selection indirectly through narrow interpretation and to conflict with the broad access to public affairs under ICCPR Article 25. Second, even complaints satisfying the standing threshold

encounter high rejection rates on procedural grounds such as deadlines, proof requirements, and formal defects, which would appear to violate Venice Guideline II.3.3.b's demand for simple, formalism-free procedures and rendering the remedy inaccessible in practice contrary to ICCPR Article 2.3. Third, no statutory guarantee exists for public hearings or observer access at any level—CoEC, National Electoral Commission, Kúria, or Constitutional Court—sessions remain closed or discretionary, which breaches Venice Guideline II.3.3.h's right to a hearing involving both parties and Copenhagen Document paragraph 12 on observer presence. Fourth, the National Electoral Commission's composition, with parliament-elected majority plus party delegates, combined with documented doubts about Kúria case-allocation practices and executive influence on the judiciary, undermines perceived independence and impartiality, conflicting with Venice Guideline II.3.1 and the overall integrity required by ECHR Protocol 1 Article 3.

The final two criticisms carry less weight upon examination. Public hearings are granted routinely and, as complaints are given in written form with justified written responses published by law with a right to appeal, it is difficult to identify what procedural changes would add in terms of guarantees. The composition of the National Electoral Commission includes both members designated by a reinforced majority in Parliament and members of both parliamentary groups and national lists to further guarantee pluralism. Alternative compositions would certainly be permissible—and political preferences for a different system are understandable—but in no sense is it required by international standards, which necessarily encompass a variety of organizational schemes. Our analysis will therefore focus on the first two criticisms: whether the exclusion of general interest complaints and strict procedural guidelines runs afoul of the Venice Guidelines and the ICCPR and render remedy inaccessible.

2.3.1. Complaints resolved by the NVB

At the level of the National Electoral Commission (NVB), a remarkably large number of complaints were filed even before the day of the election. In terms of methodology, we opted to take the 100 most recent decisions from the seven sessions preceding election day in order and processed them through a generative AI-powered note taking and synthesis engine to systematically extract and code themes, to produce qualitative study of the decisions and examine the quality of complaints and the reasoning of the decisions. This study reveals systematic application of procedural and substantive filters that resolve the overwhelming majority of complaints through rejection while granting limited, narrowly tailored remedies in the minority of upheld cases. It also reveals a key reason for this system: the sheer quantity of complaints even under the present system means that a filter is necessary to differentiate between frivolous and well-founded complaints.

Initial rejections predominantly rest on procedural failures or standing deficiencies: complaints are dismissed for failure to prove an ongoing violation, as when screenshots of social media posts lack evidence of currency at filing; for lack of specificity, where 47 cited articles are presented without individualized linkage to violations; for procedural and formal errors including missing petitioner identification data or expired deadlines; for evidence deficiencies such as broken links or unverifiable timestamps; for lack of personal affectedness, where complainants or their parties are neither named nor targeted in the relevant posters or articles; for absence of jurisdiction over private platform moderation policies; and for filings outside statutory windows.

Among complaints clearing these thresholds but ultimately unsuccessful, rejections cite constitutional protection of opinion, treating campaign materials as value judgments rather than factual statements subject to electoral sanction; absence of qualifying campaign activity, excluding news reports, charity events, or social services lacking direct voting calls or dominant campaign symbols; and failure of proof on intent to mislead or evidentiary insufficiency, where screenshots or videos do not demonstrate legal violation or voter influence. Negative outcomes after review further invoke subjectivity of political claims, with the Commission declining to act as truth-checker for slogans; inconclusive evidence preventing perpetrator identification and sanction; balancing of rights favoring freedom of expression over misleading-content allegations absent objective falsehoods on voting mechanics; administrative legality of official actions and classification of content as protected value judgment. In the minority of accepted complaints the Commission establishes violations of fairness, good faith, and proper exercise of rights, issuing immediate remedies including formal violation declarations, cease-and-desist orders prohibiting recurrence, mandatory content removal from social media or official pages, significant monetary fines and publication requirements.

Upheld campaign violation complaints include: misleading voter instructions that encouraged invalid dual-list ballots, the physical destruction of rival campaign posters, exploitation of minors as political props in videos, the abuse of public resources through taxpayer-funded municipal newspapers for partisan attacks, the misuse of official infrastructure or branding for partisan purposes, and a pronounced quantitative-qualitative media imbalance in coverage on public-service outlets such as hirado.hu showing systematic favoritism toward the government and exclusion of opposition parties. This tier provides a necessary filter to allow the Kúria to focus on cases with a more solid foundation.

2.3.2. Appeals to the Kúria

A similar qualitative analysis of 21 Kúria documents on electoral cases demonstrates the Kúria functioning as a secondary filter and, in many instances, a final arbitration. Cases reaching this level are rejected at a far lower rate than at the NVB. While our

study does not extend to every case that reached this level, we consider the sample—which includes all the most significant cases—representative of the body's functioning. The Kúria rejects five of the complaints analyzed outright on formal or standing grounds, partially rejects one, and resolves the remaining 16 through nine negative and seven positive merits decisions. The Kúria consistently prioritizes evidentiary rigor, statutory text, and constitutional protections over expansive interpretations of campaign violations. The five outright rejections and one partial rejection were issued without any substantive examination of the merits. They were based solely on formal deficiencies, such as failure to specify the violated legal provisions with supported reasoning, omission of required personal identification numbers, absence of documents proving representation, or lack of standing. The partial case (Kvk.V.39.077/2026/9) rejects the second applicant on standing while accepting the first for merits review. Negative decisions among the 16 substantive cases uniformly uphold lower rulings or dismiss complaints on grounds of insufficient evidence, non-applicable law, or protected expression.

The seven positive decisions cluster into three categories: three public-media bias rulings on social platforms overturn lower rejections by establishing that public-service providers bear heightened neutrality duties extending to Facebook pages and portals, confirming disproportionate pro-government favoritism on specific days or through overall patterns and adjusting fines accordingly; three child-use rulings refine boundaries by finding violations where children are focal visual elements in political messages regardless of spontaneity or consent while clearing incidental background presence; and one freedom-of-expression ruling protects campaign slogans referencing opponents as permissible political association. Many of these decisions will go on to appeal before the Constitutional Court, but what the analysis reveals consistent approach to each case, not oriented towards a political result but rather the application of consistent Kúria doctrine.

2.3.3. Final Appeal: the Constitutional Court

The final level of appeal, which only pertains to questions of constitutional rights, is the Constitutional Court. Qualitative analysis of nine documents pertaining to seven cases on appeals of Kúria decisions shows the Court rejecting four complaints without merits review on formal or jurisdictional grounds while annulling the Kúria's rulings in all three accepted cases, consistently identifying *contra legem* judicial law-making and inadequate reasoning as constitutional defects. The prior filtering mechanism again proves its value: a full, fair and remarkably swift resolution of the significant cases, while protecting the system from the burden of frivolous cases and undue judicialization of the electoral process. The four rejected complaints fail admissibility because they invoke non-fundamental constitutional provisions such as separation of powers or statutory interpretation rules (vocational-school campaigning case), deny the legitimacy of the Fundamental Law without specifying violated rights or annulment requests

(blank-sheet candidate-registration case), lack definite requests detailing rights violations and unconstitutionality reasons (entire-election challenge), or fail to raise fundamental constitutional issues where the Kúria already addressed fair-trial and neutrality aspects adequately (hirado.hu article-title bias case). In the three accepted cases the Court annuls every Kúria decision. Given the small number of cases, sweeping conclusions are not possible, but the Court’s willingness to take seriously appeals satisfying constitutional criteria is evident. In each case, the Constitutional Court sought to ensure both judicial modesty in the face of legislative lacunae as well as the prima facie primacy of the rights of free speech and editorial freedom by media outlets over the excessively broad application of laws.

2.4.Conclusion

Upon analyzing the actual functioning of the appellate bodies in electoral dispute cases, we return to the two main criticisms of the system. As to the first criticism—that standing is limited to persons directly affected in their rights—the requirements of Venice Guideline II.3.3.g for a speedy timeframe for both lodging and deciding complaints and appeals necessitates a quality filter. If the door were opened to anyone presenting a complaint on the grounds of general interest, unscrupulous and excessively litigious parties could collapse the system, eliminating the its arbitration function, forcing appellate bodies to relitigate complaints long after the damage has been done and rendering it functionally impossible to provide remedy in valid cases. Furthermore, the documents cited call for appellants and authorities not to “be able to choose the appeal body” (Venice Guideline II.3.3.c., for “everyone [to] have an effective means of redress” (Copenhagen Document 5.10) and for citizens to “take part in public affairs” “without unreasonable restrictions” (ICCPR 25). What we see here are reasonable restrictions to ensure effective means of redress to those whose interests are actually engaged, while the system of automatic case allocation already fulfills Venice II.3.3.c without any need to broaden criteria for standing. The criteria are in fact quite broad: anyone whose rights are affected may apply, whether a nominating body, a candidate, a citizen, or any other legal person. It seems a reasonable requirement that a complainant must demonstrate a genuine interest or direct impact—in other words, that they actually have something to complain about.

As to the second criticism—that formal criteria for the acceptance or rejection of complaints are excessively strict—the criticism seems to rest on an overly broad understanding of the term “formalism.” Any court must apply formal procedural criteria in order to function. It is a matter of common sense that courts must apply systematic criteria in the admission and parsing of evidence, arguments, and cases. Formalism in the sense of Venice Guideline II.3.3.b must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the functioning of a Western legal system. The presentation of a complaint without evidence, evidence without complaint, complainants who are unidentifiable or broad

grievances with the expectation that the court will carry out a prospective investigation on behalf of the complainant are contrary to the functioning of any judicial system and make the provision of quick, effective remedies practically impossible. Indeed, in order to ensure, as Article 2.3 of the ICCPR asks “that any person whose rights or freedom [are] violated shall have effective remedy” and that such remedy will be granted speedily, some filter against frivolous claims is necessary. Even under the purportedly strict rules, cases directly denying the validity of the constitution or the elections themselves have reached the very highest level of appeal. It is difficult to conclude, upon examining actual rejection decisions, that we are faced with an excessive, abstract, or abusive formalism rather than a rational application of principles of judicial process. The facts cited in these complaints therefore appear to be necessary in order to fulfill the requirements of international standards and to provide effective remedy and genuine arbitration of the electoral process as it unfolds.

2.5.Election Day

Liberty Coalition for a Free and Fair Election deployed more than 80 observers who carried out monitoring activities across the entire country. In the course of their work, they were present in 45 single-member constituencies and visited 60 polling stations.

Overall, they gave a positive assessment of the work of the polling stations and of the general conduct of the elections. They did not encounter any major incidents affecting the integrity or proper conduct of the electoral process. At present, they continue to participate in observation activities, including monitoring the counting of votes.

Polling commissions were adequately prepared to assist voters with special needs, including persons with disabilities. Those unable to attend in person were afforded the opportunity to vote through mobile ballot boxes. Each voter received two ballots (one for the national list and one for an individual candidate) and was provided with an opportunity to complete them in a designated voting booth ensuring the secrecy of the vote. Votes were cast in an anonymous manner.

During the course of the observation, members of the mission noted some incidents during the voting process. According to the observers, none of the identified irregularities, whether considered individually or cumulatively, resulted in a breach of European electoral standards. Based on media reports and information provided by the electoral authorities, there were a few more notable incidents, mostly linked to opposition parties – for example, a bodyguard of a leading opposition candidate entered a polling station wearing a party badge – but these did not materially affect the professional conduct of the elections.

Members of the election commissions did not object to the presence of international observers – a guarantee of a free and fair election – and responded to all inquiries regarding the conduct of the elections.

Election commissions were composed of individuals appointed by all political parties (both opposition and governing parties), as well as independent members elected by local government authorities. Voters exercised their right to vote freely.

2.6. International Standards

According to the Venice Commission and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, parliamentary elections should be conducted according to the principles of pluralism, stability, free expression, neutrality, and free election protest.

Pluralism: the freedom of political parties to compete with one another and the diversity of their programs.

Hungary has had a democratic multi-party system since 1990. The political system is characterised by a dominant ruling coalition and a diverse, and at times fragmented, opposition landscape.

A total of seven national party lists were registered for the 2026 parliamentary elections. These include the governing coalition (Fidesz-KDNP), major opposition parties, as well as several smaller political entities. The contestants represent a broad spectrum of political ideologies, including conservatism, Christian democracy, national conservatism, social democracy, liberalism, and other centrist and alternative political platforms.

Stability: the electoral system should not be changed within at least one year before the elections, including the composition of electoral commissions and constituency boundaries.

The Hungarian parliamentary democracy framework is defined by the Fundamental Law adopted in 2011, which, in this respect, does not contain significant differences compared to the previous Constitution amended in 1989.

Based on the meetings held during the observation mission, no changes to electoral regulations were identified in the preceding year. Accordingly, the principle of legal stability was respected.

Free expression: elections must be conducted under conditions ensuring the free expression of the opinion of the electorate in its choice of legislature.

Expressing the opinion of a person entitled to vote consists in the possibility of casting a vote by ballot in a direct manner— by voting in person at a polling station—or indirectly, through postal voting.

Neutrality: elections should be characterized by the principle of neutrality and the prohibition of involvement, especially by executive authorities, in the election campaign in ways that support the election interests of the ruling group.⁷

Electoral protests: free access to courts should be ensured regarding possible election protests.⁸

Complaints on violations in single-mandate constituency elections, including against local media, are filed with CoECs, while complaints on nationwide election issues are considered by the NVB.⁹ Most CoEC decisions can be appealed to the NVB. All NVB decisions, including on complaints and appeals, are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court.¹⁰ The constitutionality of Supreme Court decisions can be challenged before the Constitutional Court.

The subject has been addressed in greater detail in the preceding section.

2024 electoral law changes

The amendments to Hungarian electoral legislation adopted in 2024 introduced several changes affecting both the technical administration of elections and the structure of electoral competition. These included modifications to constituency boundaries, adjustments to certain voting procedures, and changes to electoral timelines, officially justified by the authorities as necessary to reflect demographic developments and to streamline the electoral process. However, the timing and manner of adoption—often characterised by limited consultation and expedited parliamentary procedure—were criticised by opposition actors and some observers as lacking sufficient transparency and inclusive debate.

A central line of criticism concerns changes related to voting arrangements, in particular those affecting non-resident citizens and postal voting. Hungary has for several years allowed citizens living abroad without a registered domestic address to vote by mail, a mechanism widely perceived as benefiting groups considered politically favourable to the governing parties. While the 2024 amendments did not fundamentally redesign this system, critics argue that the continued asymmetry between postal voting for non-residents and more restrictive procedures for citizens temporarily abroad raises concerns regarding equality of suffrage and the uniformity of voting conditions.

⁷ European Court of Human Rights Verdict of April 27, 2010, *Tanase v. Moldova*, sec. 179; ECHR of April 21, 2014, *Danis and Association of Ethnic Turks v. Romania*, sec. 46.

⁸ European Court of Human Rights Verdict of December 1, 2020, *Astradsson v. Iceland*, where it was established that the improprieties in the procedures of nominating judges may be a violation of the right to the “legally established court” in cases adjudicated with their participation.

⁹ As per the 2018 amendments, appeals against CoEC decisions on candidate registration are filed with RECs.

¹⁰ REC decisions on appeals regarding candidate registration are also subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court. Voter registration cases can be submitted to the competent Regional Court.

Another major point of contention relates to the redrawing of electoral district boundaries. Amendments adopted in 2024 included adjustments to constituency maps, notably reducing the number of districts in Budapest, traditionally an opposition stronghold, while increasing representation in certain growing areas. These **changes were officially justified by demographic developments**, as population figures in several constituencies, including Budapest, have declined while others have experienced growth, and were carried out in accordance with the applicable legal framework.

At the same time, criticism has focused on the specific delineation of constituency boundaries, particularly in Budapest, with some observers arguing that redistricting may amount to **gerrymandering**, potentially reinforcing structural advantages for the incumbent governing coalition. It should be noted, however, that the redrawing of electoral boundaries was required by law to preserve proportional representation to offset population imbalance between districts and preserve equal representation.

2.7. Conclusions

Hungary's electoral system combines a stable legal framework with a mixed majoritarian–proportional design that promotes both governability and representativeness, while remaining accessible to new political actors through relatively low entry thresholds and public campaign support. It is further strengthened by a multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism characterized by rapid procedures, structured filtering, and robust procedural guarantees, ensuring effective and timely protection of electoral integrity in line with international standards.

No amendments to the electoral legislation were introduced within the preceding year that would undermine the stability of the electoral system or the principle of equality, including equality of opportunity. The electoral framework was found to uphold the principles of pluralism, stability, freedom of expression, neutrality, and to provide for an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism.

Following a comprehensive review of electoral legislation and its practical implementation at all levels of election administration, as well as observation conducted in 60 Election Commissions on 12 April 2026, the Mission concludes that the parliamentary elections were conducted in compliance with applicable national and international standards and principles, generally effectively ensuring universal, direct, secret, free, and equal suffrage.

On election day, no circumstances were identified that would compromise the principles of free and fair expression of the will of the voters.

3. Election Funding & Campaign Finance

Hungary's campaign finance system is based on a formally robust legal framework combining public funding, restricted private donations, and institutional oversight, but its effectiveness is undermined by limited real-time transparency, the removal of spending caps, and the growing complexity of digital and indirect financing, which together raise concerns about equality of opportunity and the practical enforceability of electoral fairness.

3.1. Overview of general rules regulating election funding & campaign finance

The financing of election campaigns constitutes a fundamental component of democratic competition and electoral integrity. In Hungary, the legal framework combines public funding with regulated private donations, while explicitly prohibiting foreign contributions.¹¹ The structure of campaign finance is therefore intended to ensure both fairness and sovereignty within the electoral process. However, the practical functioning of this system raises important questions about transparency, enforcement, and equality of opportunity among political actors.

Hungary's campaign finance system is governed by legislation regulating political party operations and campaign cost transparency. Political parties are required to publish annual financial reports detailing revenues and expenditures, including campaign-related finances.¹² Only Hungarian natural persons are permitted to donate, while contributions from foreign entities, legal persons, or anonymous sources are strictly prohibited.¹³ Oversight is exercised by the State Audit Office, which is responsible for auditing compliance and enforcing sanctions where necessary.¹⁴ These provisions reflect widely accepted democratic standards and align with European norms in formal terms.

3.2. Identified concerns

Despite the formal robustness of this framework, the system suffers from structural limitations. Most notably, oversight is conducted primarily after elections, meaning that real-time transparency during campaigns is limited.¹⁵ This restricts the ability of observers and the public to assess financial flows as they occur and reduces the deterrent effect of oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, the removal of campaign expenditure

¹¹ OSCE/ODIHR, *Hungary Election Observation Report* (2026), p. 12.

¹² Act on the Operation and Financial Management of Political Parties (1989), pp. 5–7.

¹³ Act on Campaign Cost Transparency (2013), p. 10.

¹⁴ State Audit Office of Hungary, *Annual Report* (2025), p. 18.

¹⁵ Transparency International Hungary, *Campaign Finance Analysis* (2024), p. 22.

limits in 2025 significantly altered the competitive landscape, allowing financial capacity to play a greater role in determining campaign visibility and effectiveness.¹⁶

The removal of spending caps has broader implications for electoral fairness. In systems where financial resources are unevenly distributed, unlimited spending can amplify existing inequalities between political actors. Established parties with strong donor networks or institutional advantages may benefit disproportionately, while newer or smaller parties may struggle to compete on equal terms. This raises the question of whether formal legal equality can translate into substantive political equality under such conditions.

Transparency issues further complicate the analysis. Financial disclosures are aggregate and self-reported, providing limited insight into donor distribution or contribution sizes.¹⁷ As a result, independent verification of campaign financing structures remains difficult. Observers have also noted potential discrepancies between declared revenues and the visible scale of campaign activities, although no conclusive evidence of legal violations has been established.¹⁸ This highlights a broader issue: the gap between formal reporting requirements and practical transparency.

Where real-time transparency is limited and expenditure ceilings have been lifted, rapid growth in campaign funding can occur without adequate scrutiny during the period when it matters most. The question is not only whether political actors have equal access to resources, but whether the sources and scale of those resources are visible enough to allow meaningful oversight.

The case of the TISZA Party illustrates these dynamics particularly clearly. The party has presented itself as a grassroots movement financed through small individual donations, but based on available TISZA reports from 2025¹⁹ the average per donor campaign contribution exceeds USD700 per person. Financial disclosures indicate rapid growth in funding that significantly outpaces the expansion of its supporter base.²⁰ This discrepancy suggests that funding may be concentrated among fewer donors or involve higher-value contributions than typically associated with micro-donation models.²¹ Such patterns do not necessarily imply illegality but do raise important questions about the nature of the party's financial base—and about whether the current framework is equipped to reveal them in time to be meaningful.

¹⁶ Hungarian Electoral Reform Analysis (2025), p. 9.

¹⁷ State Audit Office of Hungary (2025), p. 25.

¹⁸ OSCE/ODIHR (2026), p. 18.

¹⁹ Q1 2025: <http://magyartisza.hu/pdf/transzparencia/penzugyi-kimutatas-2025-q1.pdf>; Q2 2025: <http://magyartisza.hu/pdf/transzparencia/penzugyi-kimutatas-2025-q2.pdf>; Q3 2025: <http://magyartisza.hu/pdf/transzparencia/penzugyi-kimutatas-2025-q3.pdf> (access: 02.04.2026)

²⁰ OSCE/ODIHR, *Needs Assessment Mission Report* (2026), p. 15.

²¹ Transparency International Hungary (2024), p. 30.

2024 annual financial statements²², corresponding to the formation year of the TISZA Party, provides an important baseline for assessing campaign financing dynamics. The party reported approximately HUF 818.9 million (USD 2,545,000) in private donations without providing a clear breakdown of the total amount attributable to above-threshold (HUF 500,000 / USD 1,554) donors or a consolidated summary of donation distribution. As a result, it is not possible to determine from the published statements the extent to which funding is derived from a broad base of small contributors or from more concentrated sources.

Campaigning in Hungary has also become increasingly digitalized. Social media platforms, particularly Facebook, play a central role in political communication. Financial resources now translate directly into online visibility, targeted advertising, and algorithmic amplification,²³ making the source and scale of digital campaign spending as consequential as traditional expenditure—and considerably harder to trace.

This context makes the engagement data surrounding opposition leader Péter Magyar's Facebook presence particularly noteworthy. According to publicly available engagement data, the rate of engagement with opposition leader Péter Magyar's Facebook posts exceeds comparable figures for such leaders as Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, or Volodymyr Zelensky. Given the statutory ban on foreign campaign contributions and the prohibition on social media advertising for politicians and political parties, such organic rates are statistically difficult—if not impossible—to explain without page promotion, boosted reach, or paid advertising. The phenomenon cannot be accounted for by algorithm alone. The relatively low international name recognition of Péter Magyar outside Hungary further complicates this analysis, even against a backdrop of generally high awareness of the Hungarian elections among foreign audiences. The Mission's requests for a meeting with TISZA, among others to understand and clarify the party's use of social media promotion, went unanswered.

These digital financing questions do not arise in isolation. The broader international context adds another layer of complexity. While no verified evidence exists of direct foreign financing of political parties, international funding structures influence the political environment indirectly. These include EU funding programs supporting civil society organizations, political affiliations within European party groups, and long-term funding of NGOs and media initiatives by international foundations.²⁴ Such mechanisms shape public discourse and informational dynamics without constituting direct campaign financing, yet they remain relevant for assessing the overall balance of the electoral environment.

²² <http://magyartisza.hu/pdf/transzparencia/penzugyi-kimutatas-2024.pdf>

²³ NMHH, *Media Market Report* (2025), p. 40.

²⁴ European Court of Auditors, *NGO Funding Report* (2025), pp. 14–16.

The role of transnational advocacy networks and international media ecosystems should not be overlooked. These actors can influence political narratives, frame public debates, and contribute to agenda-setting processes. While their activities are often legitimate and protected under democratic norms, their interaction with domestic political processes introduces additional complexity into the assessment of electoral fairness and transparency.

The rise of digital campaigning also raises concerns regarding the use of data analytics, targeted messaging, and artificial intelligence-generated content. These tools allow political actors to optimize communication strategies and reach specific voter groups more efficiently. However, they also create challenges for transparency, particularly when such activities are not clearly disclosed or regulated within existing campaign finance frameworks.

In addition to formal campaign spending, modern electoral environments include areas that are difficult to regulate, such as third-party advocacy, affiliated organizations, and transnational networks. These actors may contribute to shaping electoral outcomes without appearing in official financial reports.²⁵ This creates a grey zone in campaign finance that challenges traditional regulatory approaches and complicates efforts to ensure a level playing field.

From a comparative perspective, similar challenges can be observed in other democratic systems, including the United States and various EU member states. In many cases, regulatory frameworks have struggled to keep pace with evolving campaign practices, particularly in the digital sphere. Hungary's experience can therefore be understood as part of a broader global trend in which traditional models of campaign finance regulation are increasingly under strain.

3.3. Conclusions

Hungary's campaign finance system provides a structured legal framework but is limited by insufficient real-time transparency and reliance on post-election audits. The rapid financial growth of emerging political actors—and anomalies in their digital campaign activity—highlights the need for greater scrutiny of funding structures, donor concentration, and social media promotion practices. Strengthening transparency mechanisms, enhancing oversight, and clarifying the boundaries of indirect political financing would contribute to improving electoral integrity and ensuring fair competition among political actors.

²⁵ OSCE/ODIHR (2026), p. 20.

4. Media Landscape

The Hungarian media landscape is formally pluralistic and regulated by constitutional guarantees of press freedom and detailed media laws, yet in practice it is highly polarised, with strong state-supported public media (MTVA/MTI), significant commercial actors, and substantial consolidation of outlets under both market and pro-government ownership (notably KESMA), alongside a rapidly growing but fragmented digital ecosystem increasingly shaped by platform politics, disinformation concerns, and declining trust in traditional media.

4.1. The legal framework

The foundations of Hungary's media system are enshrined in the Fundamental Law, particularly Article IX, which guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The state recognizes and protects media pluralism and ensures conditions for the free dissemination of information. These freedoms are not absolute; they may be restricted to safeguard human dignity and other constitutional values. The Fundamental Law also establishes general principles for election campaigns, including the requirement to guarantee equal opportunities for access to the media.²⁶

The current regulatory framework was established by two key pieces of legislation adopted in 2010: Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and mass media, and Act CIV of 2010 on freedom of the press and the fundamental rules on media content. These acts created a unified regulatory regime covering print, broadcast, and online media, with the stated aim of aligning Hungarian law with European standards.

Act CLXXXV governs the structure of the media market and rules on political advertising. It prohibits editorial interference by entities commissioning political advertisements and requires clear labelling of such content together with identification of the sponsor. The Act also imposes programming quotas: private broadcasters must allocate more than half of their airtime to European works and at least one-third to Hungarian productions. Public-service broadcasters face stricter requirements, including a quota for independent productions.

Act CIV sets out core content principles, including respect for human dignity, prohibition of hate speech, and the obligation to provide accurate and responsible coverage of public affairs. These provisions enable regulatory intervention where breaches occur. On 9 December 2011, the Constitutional Court partially invalidated certain provisions, ruling that they disproportionately restricted freedom of expression—particularly regarding oversight of the press and online media and the

²⁶ Article IX of the Fundamental Law of Hungary of 23 March 2013.

protection of journalistic sources. Nevertheless, the core centralized structure of the media regulatory system remained intact.²⁷

4.2. The 2013 Electoral Procedure Act: media regulations during election campaigns

Rules governing media conduct during elections are contained in the 2013 Act on Electoral Procedure. Political advertisements in public media must be broadcast free of charge and on an equal basis, without editorial commentary. Private media may carry such advertisements provided they ensure equal and non-discriminatory access. Advertising is prohibited on election day and during the final 48 hours before voting.²⁸

The Act also prescribes detailed airtime allocations. In parliamentary elections, for example, 470 minutes are allocated to party lists and 130 minutes to national minority lists. This time is divided equally among qualifying contestants and broadcast in designated slots to ensure formal equality of opportunity.²⁹

4.3. The Agents Act, the media, and the draft law on transparency in public life

In 2017, Parliament adopted the so-called Agents Act, which required media outlets and organizations receiving foreign funding above a certain threshold to register and label themselves as foreign-supported entities. The government argued that the law enhanced transparency and countered foreign political influence. Critics contended that it stigmatized independent media and civil society, creating a chilling effect on pluralism and freedom of expression.

In 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-78/18) ruled the law incompatible with EU law, citing violations of the free movement of capital and fundamental rights. Hungary subsequently repealed the original legislation and replaced it with milder transparency provisions.³⁰

In 2025, the government introduced a further draft bill on transparency in public life. Among other measures, it proposed stricter restrictions on foreign funding, the possibility of administrative sanctions, and even the suspension or closure of organizations or media outlets deemed to constitute a “threat to sovereignty” through influence on electoral outcomes. The proposal triggered widespread domestic and

²⁷ Summary of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary on the Media Laws in 2011 by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Decision n. 1746/B/2010, https://tasz.hu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/hclu_const_court_media_law_dec_brief.pdf (access: 09.04.2026).

²⁸ Section 147 – Section 147/D Electoral Procedure Act of 2013.

²⁹ Section 147 – Section 147/D Electoral Procedure Act of 2013.

³⁰ Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 June 2020 – European Commission v Hungary (Case C-78/18), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CA0078> (access: 09.04.2026).

international criticism,³¹ with opponents warning that it would institutionalize self-censorship, undermine media pluralism, and restrict civil-society activity.³² In response to the backlash, adoption of the bill has been suspended.

4.4. Media regulatory and supervisory bodies

Act CLXXXV of 2010 established the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH)³³ and the Media Council operating within it.³⁴ These bodies are responsible for market supervision, frequency allocation, tender procedures, and enforcement of content and advertising rules, including the imposition of fines.

Public media are managed by the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA),³⁵ which distributes state budget allocations and provides technical and operational support to public-service broadcasters.

4.5. The Media Landscape and Access to Information

The Hungarian media environment is formally pluralistic yet deeply polarized. Government-affiliated outlets play a dominant role in the traditional sector, while social media has become the primary arena for political mobilization—and a vector for disinformation.

Hungary's media are divided between a state-supported public sector and a commercial sector. The public sector is centered on the MTVA-managed portfolio, which includes television channels, radio stations, and the Hungarian news agency MTI. These outlets are financed primarily from the state budget and are widely perceived as closely aligned with the government.³⁶

Commercial media are owned by a mix of domestic and foreign investors. Major players include RTL Klub (RTL Group) and TV2; a significant portion of the market is consolidated under pro-government ownership through the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA).

³¹ *A Threat to the Core. Why the New Hungarian Transparency Bill is an Attack on the Foundations of the European Union*, 21.05.2025, <https://verfassungsblog.de/hungary-transparency-law-foreign-funding> (access: 09.04.2026).

³² *Odstaszyć darczyńców, zagłodzić dziennikarzy. Orbán rozprawia się z niezależnymi mediami*, 28.05.2025, <https://krytykapolityczna.pl/swiat/wegry-orban-media-ustawa-o-przejrzystosci-zycia-publicznego-wolnosc-slowa/> (access: 09.04.2026).

³³ Part Four Chapter I of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media.

³⁴ Part Four Chapter I of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media.

³⁵ Section 136 of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media.

³⁶ *Hungary Media Landscape Overview*, <https://www.emediamonitor.net/en/country-information/europe/media-monitoring-hungary> (access: 09.04.2026).

As of 2024, the market remains saturated.³⁷ Linear television retains strong reach (6.2 million regular users), nearly matching internet-based news consumption (6.1 million). Radio reaches approximately 7 million Hungarians weekly, with an average daily listening time of 226 minutes. Print media continue their long-term decline, with stark generational differences: nearly 60% of 60–75-year-olds read newspapers or magazines, compared with fewer than one-third of 16–29-year-olds. The leading daily by reach is **Blikk** (465,000 readers).³⁸

The online segment is vibrant, with 3,039 registered content services at the end of 2024, over two-thirds of which are news portals.³⁹ The most visited sites include *index.hu*, *24.hu*, *origo.hu*, *blikk.hu*, and *telex.hu*. Despite political polarization, audience behavior shows limited “echo-chamber” effects: the average Hungarian consumes content from 13 different media outlets, often crossing ideological lines. Since 2010, 36 new government-critical media outlets have been launched and remain active.⁴⁰ Pro-government and opposition messages reach broadly comparable audiences—65% and 64% of adults, respectively.

Funding remains a major point of contention. Public and pro-government media benefit from direct state-budget support and government contracts, while opposition outlets are largely excluded from these sources and rely heavily on Western grants from the United States and the EU. The government portrays such funding as a threat to national sovereignty. Independent analyses indicate that government-critical publishers generated nearly 100 billion HUF in revenue in 2024, with RTL alone accounting for over 61 billion HUF.⁴¹

Overall trust in the media is low.⁴² Television is still regarded as the most credible source of political information (32 %), yet it is also perceived as the most biased (72%). Social media has become the dominant channel for most information topics (except sports), with Hungarians showing above-EU-average engagement (81%).⁴³

YouTube (71% reach), Facebook (58%), and TikTok (43%) dominate. TikTok has surged as the preferred platform for short-form AI-assisted political content. Instagram reaches around 30 %, while X (Twitter) remains marginal at 7–8%.⁴⁴

³⁷ *Media Market Report*, NMHH, 2025, https://english.nmhh.hu/publication/1/Media_Market_Report_2025 (access: 09.04.2026)..

³⁸ *Press Freedom in Hungary. Report on the State of the Hungarian Media Market in 2024*, Nézőpont Intézet, 2025, <https://nezopont.hu/images/sajtoszabadsag%202025/Sajtoszabadsag%20Magyarorszagon%20pdf.pdf> (access: 09.04.2026).

³⁹ *Media Market Report*.

⁴⁰ *Media Market Report*.

⁴¹ *Press Freedom in Hungary*.

⁴² *Media Literacy and Trust in the Media*, NMHH, 2025, https://nmhh.hu/cikk/251348/Mediatudatosag_es_a_mediaba_vetett_bizalom (access: 09.04.2026).

⁴³ *Media Market Report*.

⁴⁴ *Digital 2025: Hungary*, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-hungary> (access: 09.04.2026).

Relations between the government and major platforms have deteriorated. The Orbán administration has repeatedly accused Meta of “shadow-banning” pro-government content while allegedly amplifying opposition voices.⁴⁵ In the run-up to the 12 April 2026 election, several pro-government pages were reportedly removed from Facebook.⁴⁶ Several high profile accounts, such as FIDESZ, PM Viktor Orbán, Menczer Tamás MP, and minister János Lázár, had posts moved down in the news feed. The fact was communicated by Facebook online notification⁴⁷

TikTok has faced accusations of hosting coordinated disinformation networks, including the AI-generated “Matryoshka” operation supporting the governing party⁴⁸ and alleged Ukrainian-linked networks boosting the opposition.⁴⁹

The foregoing may be considered an in-kind campaign contribution constituting a circumvention of the prohibition on foreign financing of election campaigns. This is an unresolved concern.

4.6. The DSA mechanism and the Romanian scenario

Under the EU Digital Services Act, the European Commission has activated its Rapid Response System to monitor platforms for disinformation ahead of the Hungarian vote.⁵⁰ The move is justified by reference to the 2024 Romanian election annulment linked to alleged and since discredited TikTok influence operations. Government-aligned voices have criticized the mechanism as politically motivated interference, pointing to the opaque selection of “factcheckers” and “trusted flaggers.”⁵¹

⁴⁵ *Facebook Removes Hungarian Pro-Government Newspaper Pages Weeks Before Election*, 27.02.2026, <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/facebook-removes-hungarian-pro-government-newspaper-pages-weeks-before-election/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁴⁶ *Facebook Restricts PM Orbán’s Content Weeks Ahead of Hungarian Election*, 18.03.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/facebook-meta-censorship-orban-hungary-election-2026/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁴⁷ Facebook notes, November 9-11, 2025.

⁴⁸ *Ukraine-Linked Network Accused of Boosting Hungary’s Opposition*, 21.03.2026, <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/ukraine-linked-network-accused-of-boosting-hungarys-opposition/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁴⁹ *Influence Campaign on TikTok Uses AI Videos to Boost Hungary’s Orbán Ahead of Crucial Elections*, 20.03.2026, <https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/influence-campaign-uses-ai-tiktok-videos-to-boost-hungarys-viktor-orban/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁵⁰ *EC launches DSA crackdown on ‘disinformation’ ahead of Hungary elections*, 18.03.2026, <https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/03/ec-launches-dsa-crackdown-on-disinformation-ahead-of-hungary-elections/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁵¹ *Not Only the Digital Services Act: Systemic Threats to Freedom of Speech and the Integrity of Democratic Elections in the European Union*, Warsaw 2026, https://ordoiuris.pl/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/not_only_the_digital_services_act_30032026_ebook.pdf (access: 09.04.2026).

4.7. Narratives of possible interference

Narratives of possible Russian interference largely originate with the VSquare investigative platform, Western outlets, such as Politico and the Financial Times, amplify those stories. Critics note that many such reports rely on anonymous and unverifiable intelligence sources and offer limited publicly available evidence of coordinated influence operations⁵².

4.8. The role of the media in the election campaign, pre-election polls, international media coverage and hostility towards journalists

Traditional and digital media remain central to campaign communication. The highly polarized environment, combined with low institutional trust and the amplification power of social media, creates an information ecosystem in which voters are exposed to diverse but often contradictory narratives.

Opinion polls published in the months before the election display unusually large discrepancies. Some independent pollsters (e.g., Medián, 21 Research Centre) showed a clear lead for the opposition TISZA party, sometimes exceeding ten percentage points⁵³. Others, perceived as closer to the government, indicated a stable Fidesz advantage or neck-and-neck race⁵⁴. This divergence has produced effectively two parallel polling realities, undermining the predictive value of surveys and turning them into instruments of political messaging.

In the weeks preceding the 12 April 2026 election, major Western outlets—including CNN, BBC, Politico Europe, and Deutsche Welle—displayed a marked departure from neutrality in their coverage of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. Orbán was consistently framed as an authoritarian leader facilitating Russian influence inside the EU, while opposition leader Péter Magyar and his TISZA party were presented as agents of democratic renewal.

Coverage relied on selective framing rather than outright fabrication: terms such as “authoritarian,” “illiberal laboratory,” and “democratic backsliding” routinely appeared in news reporting rather than opinion sections; methodological controversies surrounding polls were rarely disclosed; and Fidesz support was attributed primarily to

⁵² *Before the Vote: How the EU’s Rapid Response System Is Shaping Hungary’s Election Narrative*, 18.03.2026, <https://x.com/DIObservatory/status/2034256808068489248> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁵³ *Hungary: TISZA Dominates Hungarian Poll with 55 Percent (Medián Poll from 23.02.2026)*, <https://politpro.eu/en/hungary/opinion-polls/median-2026-02-23/parliamentary-election> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁵⁴ *New Poll by The Center Shows Orbán Leading Ahead of April Election*, 17.02.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/orban-fidesz-kdnp-lead-hungary-election-2026-center-for-fundamental-rights/> (access: 09.04.2026).

media control and clientelism rather than genuine voter preference. The sole major counter-narrative came from Fox News, which uncritically amplified U.S. conservative endorsements of Orbán and portrayed EU criticism as foreign interference. Collectively, this pattern illustrates how international media have effectively taken sides, presenting their own political priors as objective analysis.

A disturbing development of the 2026 election campaign has been the sharp rise in hostility directed at journalists—ranging from verbal abuse and intimidation to physical assaults and death threats. Unlike previous cycles, the primary targets have been reporters and crews affiliated with government-leaning or perceived “neutral” outlets.

A widely publicized incident involved a journalist from the right-leaning weekly *Mandiner*, who was physically assaulted at a TISZA party rally in 2025. First-hand accounts from media executives confirm that several television channels and news organizations have been forced to allocate substantial budgets to private security details for crews working on the ground—an unprecedented measure in Hungary’s post-1989 democratic history.

This escalation has created a climate of fear that directly undermines the safety and independence of journalistic work. The need for private security not only increases operational costs but also signals a broader erosion of the normative expectation that journalists, regardless of their editorial line, should be able to cover political events without fear of violence. The phenomenon risks further polarizing the media environment and deterring balanced on-the-ground reporting at a time when voters most need reliable information. The Liberty Coalition strongly condemns all forms of violence or intimidation against journalists and calls on all political actors to uphold the safety and professional dignity of the press as a cornerstone of a free and fair electoral process.

4.9. Electoral polls and forecasts

Public opinion polls published in the weeks preceding the elections display exceptionally large discrepancies, ranging from an 8-percentage-point lead of Fidesz over TISZA (Alapjogokért K., 30 March 2026 | N=1000 | Fidesz–KDNP 50%, TISZA 42%) to a 26-percentage-point lead of TISZA over Fidesz (Medián, 8 April 2026 | N=5000 | Fidesz–KDNP 33%, TISZA 59%).⁵⁵

Given standard margins of error associated with the declared sample sizes, such divergent results cannot simultaneously reflect an accurate picture of public opinion. At least some of these polls, if not the majority, are likely to be affected by bias. This divergence has effectively resulted in the emergence of two parallel “polling realities”,

⁵⁵ All poll data after: <https://valasztasimonitor.hu/> (access: 09.04.2026).

thereby undermining the predictive value of polling and transforming it into a tool of political communication.

The predictive value of polling is further limited by the exclusion of votes cast by citizens abroad. This includes both members of the Hungarian diaspora—primarily residing in neighboring countries such as Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, or Ukraine, and who in 2022 voted predominantly for Fidesz—and temporary emigrants, who are generally considered more supportive of the opposition. In addition, polls typically report a single level of party support, even though the Hungarian electoral system allows voters to cast a vote in single-member constituencies for independent candidate or one belonging to a party different from the one chosen on the national list.

Election forecasts based on polling data also raise methodological concerns. Although the Mission did not have access to the methodologies underlying these projections, it notes that the structure of the Hungarian electoral system makes seat allocation particularly difficult to predict. With 106 single-member constituencies, commonly used sample sizes of N=1000 respondents imply an average of fewer than 10 respondents per constituency, assuming full territorial coverage. Even where samples are demographically representative, the statistical error at the constituency level remains substantial, rendering constituency-level projections unreliable. This limitation is particularly significant given that surplus votes are added to national list results, making accurate constituency-level estimates essential for predicting the allocation of the 93 list mandates.

It is therefore likely that polling institutes base their projections on weighting previous electoral results with nationwide polling data; however, this results in even greater discrepancies. For example, a projection based on the Alapjogokért K. poll estimated 123 mandates for Fidesz–KDNP and 70 for TISZA, while a projection on the Medián data estimated 52 mandates for Fidesz–KDNP and 141 for TISZA.⁵⁶ In both cases, the remaining six mandates were distributed identically: five to Mi Hazánk and one to the Roma minority list. The difference between these projections thus amounts to as much as 71 mandates out of 199.

This issue is not new and appears to be intensifying. During the 2022 elections, polling data and forecasts on average underestimated support for Fidesz while overestimating support for the opposition to an even greater extent.

The polling and election forecasting environment in Hungary appears to constitute a particularly pronounced example of a broader trend observed in many contemporary democracies, namely a shift from measuring public opinion towards influencing it. As a result, polling data appear to provide voters with limited reliable guidance, harming the state of Hungarian democracy.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

The Mission further notes that foreign media reporting on Hungarian polling data often applies double standards. Institutes publishing results favorable to Fidesz are frequently described as pro-government or biased, whereas those publishing results favorable to TISZA are referred to as “independent.” This asymmetry endemic to the narratives about elections contributes to distorted foreign perceptions of the Hungarian political landscape and the electoral process.

Such characterizations of the Hungarian political reality abroad may also be reinforced by certain domestic media outlets. For example, as late as 10 April 2026—two days before election day—the left portal Daily News Hungary⁵⁷ published an article highlighting the above-mentioned Medián poll and raising the possibility of a two-thirds majority for TISZA. The Mission did not identify comparable coverage on the same platform of polls indicating a potential Fidesz victory.

4.10. Conclusions

Hungary’s media landscape during the 2026 parliamentary election campaign is formally pluralistic but intensely polarized. Disputes over funding, platform moderation, polling credibility, and allegations of foreign interference—as well as the weaponization of social-media platforms—further heighten information tensions.

The situation is compounded by a sharp rise in hostility towards journalists—ranging from verbal abuse to physical assaults and death threats—directed particularly at reporters from government-leaning or perceived neutral outlets. The requirement for private security details for media crews on the ground represents an unprecedented development that undermines journalistic safety and independence.

At the international level, major Western media outlets have largely abandoned neutrality, consistently framing the contest in binary geopolitical terms and selectively amplifying certain narratives while downplaying methodological controversies in polling data. This external editorial bias adds another layer of complexity to an already polarized domestic information environment.

Taken together, the combination of legal centralization, funding asymmetries, social-media-driven disinformation risks, physical threats to journalists, and partisan international coverage creates a challenging context for the conduct of a genuinely free and fair electoral process. The Liberty Coalition underscores the urgent need for all stakeholders—political actors, media organizations, platforms, and international observers—to prioritize journalistic safety, transparency in funding and moderation practices, and balanced public discourse.

⁵⁷ *Daily News Hungary – Bias and Credibility*, <https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/daily-news-hungary-bias-and-credibility/> (access: 09.04.2026).

5. Foreign Interference

This year's parliamentary elections in Hungary appear to be particularly susceptible to foreign interference—both from representatives of other countries and from representatives of international organizations. These entities appear to treat Hungary not so much as a sovereign state, but rather as one of the national battlegrounds in broader global disputes, which have not only geopolitical but also axiological dimensions.

5.1. General Remarks

A distinctive feature of the 2026 campaign has been the highly asymmetric pattern of external political involvement. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party have received explicit, high-profile public endorsements from numerous leaders of foreign political parties and governments, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, French opposition leader Marine Le Pen, and American President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance. These expressions of support have been presented as legitimate political solidarity between sovereign actors and like-minded partners. At the same time, the opposition TISZA party—led by Péter Magyar—has benefited from bilateral meetings and public expressions of political alignment with other European leaders, most notably German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While these engagements were publicized and framed as policy-oriented diplomatic contacts rather than direct campaign endorsements, they have been widely interpreted as signaling preference for governmental change in Hungary.

In contrast, the most tangible and institutionalized pressure has come from representatives of the European Union. This is categorially different from the various endorsements of, or meetings with, candidates. The sustained and public pressure exerted by EU institutions and high-ranking officials appears to violate specific norms of EU treaty law and customary international law. This concerns, *inter alia*, the obligation to respect the national identities of Member States inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures (Article 4(2) TEU), the principle of conferral of competences (Article 5 TEU), and the customary rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

5.2. Recognition of the problem of foreign interference following the 2022 elections

On 17 November 2022—more than seven months after the previous parliamentary elections in Hungary—the National Information Center (*Nemzeti Információs Központ*, NIK, one of Hungary's intelligence agencies) provided lawmakers with initial

information⁵⁸ suggesting that, despite a formal ban on foreign campaign financing, such activities had nevertheless taken place, exploiting loopholes in existing legislation.⁵⁹ The NIK disclosed further information on this matter to parliamentarians on 20 January 2023⁶⁰ and 21 June 2023.⁶¹

In response, on 21 November 2023, members of parliament introduced a bill „on the protection of national sovereignty,” the explanatory memorandum of which explicitly cited the NIK reports.⁶² The Hungarian Parliament passed this law on 22 December 2023,⁶³ establishing a new Sovereignty Protection Office, whose purpose—according to the preamble—is “to promote democratic discourse, ensure transparency in state and social decision-making processes, revealing attempts at foreign interference, and preventing interference attempts similar to those mentioned above” and the methods of operation of the new entity would be “to investigate them, and to punish under criminal law the use of foreign support in the context of elections.” The Hungarian Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the new law in a ruling dated 15 November 2024.⁶⁴

However, on 13 February 2025, after its first year of operation, the Office announced that the enacted law was not sufficiently effective to achieve its intended objectives, and therefore the Sovereignty Protection Office was “working on the necessary proposals to

⁵⁸ Nemzeti Információs Központ, *Minősítés alól feloldott iratok*, <https://nik.gov.hu/nyilvanos-jelentesek> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁵⁹ *Az egységes ellenzék külföldi kampánytámogatásának áttekintése (Időszakos beszámoló I.)*, 17.10.2022, <https://www.parlament.hu/documents/129803/64121212/Elemz%C5%91-%C3%A9rt%C3%A9kel%C5%91+vizsg%C3%A1lat+id%C5%91szakos+jelent%C3%A9s+%2820221117%294.0.NBB.pdf/0d326c7d-e9c9-f120-1f52-24cc530a70ed?t=1669203382539> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁰ *A magyarországi választások befolyásolására érkezett pénzügyi források áttekintése (Időszakos tájékoztató II.)*, 20.01.2023, https://www.parlament.hu/documents/129803/64121212/PPT_OGYNBB_20230120.pdf/28ec32f0-f281-49d9-44c3-5fdea88762e4?t=1674631807128 (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶¹ *Az Országgyűlés Nemzetbiztonsági Bizottsága 2023. június 21-i ülésén ismertetett, a Nemzeti Információs Központ által készített összefoglaló jelentés*, https://www.parlament.hu/documents/129803/64121212/%C3%96sszefoglal%C3%B3_jelent%C3%A9s_A_2022_%C3%A9vi_moi_ogyi_v%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1sok_k%C3%BClf_bef.pdf/3e4481b9-ceed-94d9-c95a-5cfa1bb15fc4?t=1687766968197 (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶² *Törvény a nemzeti szuverenitás védelméről*, T/6222, 21.11.2023, https://www.parlament.hu/web/guest/iromanyok-egyszerusitett-lekerdezes?p_p_id=hu_parlament cms_pair_portlet_PairProxy_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_auth=EUNRVwpl& hu_parlament cms_pair_portlet_PairProxy_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fcpql%2Ffogy_irom.irom_adat%3Fp_ckl%3D42%26p_iz on%3D6222 (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶³ 2023. évi LXXXVIII. törvény a nemzeti szuverenitás védelméről, <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2023-88-00-00>; English translation: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF\(2024\)006-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2024)006-e) (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁴ Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 15 November 2024, IV/02551/2024, <https://alkotmanybirosag.hu/ugyadatlap/?id=57838AD2B57B9BF0C1258B5500449DB1>; English summary: <https://hunconcourt.hu/datasheet/?id=57838AD2B57B9BF0C1258B5500449DB1> (access: 09.04.2026).

ensure more effective action against foreign-funded organizations of public life”⁶⁵ The same conclusion was later included in the annual report published by the Office on 30 June 2025,⁶⁶ which it was stated that “current regulations do not always ensure that the leaders of organizations are subject to oversight commensurate with the extent of their influence over public funds and public life.”

The result of the Office’s work was a draft bill on the “transparency of public life,” presented to parliament on 13 May 2025.⁶⁷ In response, a spokesperson for the European Commission officially stated that “the Commission has great concerns with this draft. If adopted as it is, it would constitute a serious breach of EU principles and law. Therefore, we ask that this draft be withdrawn from the legislative process.”⁶⁸ The legislative process currently remains on hold; the draft has been neither adopted nor formally rejected.

5.3. European Parliament resolutions from 2011 to 2025 as a narrative justification for foreign interference

Since Viktor Orbán became Prime Minister of Hungary on 29 May 2010, the European Parliament (EP) has adopted at least 13 resolutions questioning the Hungarian political system:⁶⁹

Viktor Orbán’s second government (2010-2014):

1. The resolution of 10 March 2011, in which the EP called on the Hungarian authorities to involve all stakeholders in the revision of the media law and the Hungarian Constitution;⁷⁰
2. The resolution of 16 February 2012, in which the EP called on the European Commission to request the opinion of the Venice Commission on the legislative

⁶⁵ Szuverenitásvédelmi Hivatal, *Indokolt a szuverenitásvédelmi jogszabályok megerősítése*, 13.02.2025, <https://szuverenitasvedelmihivatal.hu/hirek/indokolt-a-szuverenitasvedelmi-jogszabalyok-megerositse> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁶ Szuverenitásvédelmi Hivatal, *Éves jelentés 2025*, 30.06.2025, <https://szuverenitasvedelmihivatal.hu/hirek/eves-jelentes-2025> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁷ Törvény a közélet átláthatóságáról, T/11923, 13.05.2025, https://www.parlament.hu/web/guest/folyamatban-levo-torvenyjavaslatok?p_p_id=hu_parlament_cms_pair_portlet_PairProxy_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_auth=khTiQ1yL&hu_parlament_cms_pair_portlet_PairProxy_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fepsql%2Fogy_irom.irom_adat%3Fp_ckl%3D42%26p_izon%3D11923; English translation: https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/05/Bill-T11923_Transparency-of-Public-Life.pdf (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁸ *Confrontation ahead: EU Commission demands that Hungary withdraws draft transparency law*, 24.05.2025, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/24/confrontation-ahead-eu-commission-demands-that-hungary-withdraws-draft-transparency-law> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁶⁹ *Conflicts between the EU and Hungary between 2010-2020*, 19.03.2021, <https://eclj.org/geopolitics/eu/conflicts-between-the-eu-and-hungary-between-2010-2020> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁰ European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary, 2011/2510(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2011-0094_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

package consisting of the new Hungarian Constitution, the Transitional Provisions, and the cardinal laws, and to continue working together on these matters with the Council of Europe;⁷¹

3. The resolution of 3 July 2013, in which the EP urged the Hungarian authorities to implement as swiftly as possible all the measures that European Commission as the guardian of the treaties deems necessary to fully comply with EU law.⁷²

Viktor Orbán's third government (2014-2018):

4. The resolution of 10 June 2015, in which the EP noted that these recent developments have led to concerns regarding the principles of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in Hungary over the past year, which, taken together, could represent an emerging systemic threat to the rule of law in this Member State;⁷³
5. The resolution of 16 December 2015, in which the EP stated its belief that Hungary was a test for the EU to prove Union's capacity and political willingness to react to threats and breaches of its own founding values by a Member State;⁷⁴
6. The resolution of 17 May 2017, in which the EP called on the Commission to strictly monitor the use of EU funds by the Hungarian Government believing that the situation in Hungary represented a clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU and warranted the launch of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure.⁷⁵

Viktor Orbán's fourth government (2018-2022):

7. The resolution of 12 September 2018, in which the EP stated its belief that the facts and trends described in the Annex to the resolution taken together represent a systemic threat to the values of Article 2 TEU and constituted a clear risk of a serious breach thereof;⁷⁶

⁷¹ European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012 on the recent political developments in Hungary, 2012/2511(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2012-0053_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷² European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), 2012/2130(INI), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2013-0315_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷³ European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary, 2015/2700(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0227_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁴ European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary, 2015/2935(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0461_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁵ European Parliament resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary, 2017/2656(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0216_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁶ European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 2017/2131(INL), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

8. The resolution of 8 July 2021, in which the EP “condemns in the strongest possible terms the Law adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, which constitutes a clear breach of the EU’s values, principles and law.”⁷⁷

Viktor Orbán’s fifth government (2022-2026):

9. The resolution of 15 September 2022, in which the EP called on the Commission to make full use of the tools available to address the clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded;⁷⁸
10. The resolution of 1 June 2023, in which the EP condemned the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU;⁷⁹
11. The resolution of 18 January 2024, in which the EP condemned the deliberate, continuous and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU;⁸⁰
12. The resolution of 24 April 2024, in which the EP said it was appalled by the persistent systemic and deliberate breach of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary, for which it held the Hungarian Government responsible;⁸¹
13. The resolution of 25 November 2025, in which the EP said it was appalled by and condemned the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU.⁸²

⁷⁷ European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2021 on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, 2021/2780(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0362_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁸ European Parliament resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded. 2018/0902R(NLE), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0324_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁷⁹ European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds, 2023/2691(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0216_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁰ European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds, 2024/2512(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0053_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸¹ European Parliament resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications, 2024/2683(RSP), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0367_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸² European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2025 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 2018/0902R(NLE), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0283_EN.html (access: 09.04.2026).

Think tanks with diverse political views see the European Parliament’s consistent stance as a means of pressuring the European Commission, which—according to these think tanks—would prefer to adopt a pragmatic approach toward Hungary but seems to be gradually capitulating in the face of the radical activism of MEPs. The pro-European-integration Centre for European Policy Studies maintains that “in the fight between the European Parliament and the Commission, Hungary is the ominous third party in an ongoing ‘triangle of madness’” and that “the 2021 dispute shows a long-standing effort by MEPs to push the Commission to enforce the rule of law.”⁸³ The right-wing *Hungarian Conservative* states that “the European Parliament’s liberal-progressive camp has renewed attacks on Hungary after the Commission approved €16 billion (USD18.8 billion) in SAFE defense funding, with Green MEPs urging delays until after April’s election. Despite Kaja Kallas insisting funds will be audited, critics again weaponize the ‘rule of law’ to block Hungary’s military modernization and influence its election.”⁸⁴ Professor Patrick Müller of the Centre for European Integration Research at the University of Vienna has noted that “prominent members of the European Parliament contested this narrative and criticized the Commission for ‘selling out our EU values’ and for ‘paying the biggest bribe in EU history’ to the Government of Hungary.”⁸⁵

5.4. Mutual accusations of foreign interference by Russian or Ukrainian intelligence agencies

On 6 March 2026, Szabolcs Panyi, a Hungarian progressive writer and activist, published an article alleging that “the Kremlin has tasked a team of political technologists with interfering in Hungary’s April 2026 parliamentary elections. [...] Sources described the Budapest contingent as a three-person team operating on behalf of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. This task force has arrived in Budapest weeks ago, though it remains unclear whether they have yet begun their influence activities.”⁸⁶ There is no disclosed evidence to support these serious allegations. *The Hungarian Conservative*, the right of center publication, reports that Szabolcs Panyi “solely bases the narrative on anonymous American and European

⁸³ *In the fight between the European Parliament and Commission, Hungary is the ominous third party in an ongoing ‘triangle of madness’*, 09.03.2026, <https://www.ceps.eu/in-the-fight-between-the-european-parliament-and-commission-hungary-is-the-ominous-third-party-in-an-ongoing-triangle-of-madness/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁴ *Liberal-Progressive MEPs Attack Orbán, Commission over SAFE Funds in Absurd EP Debate*, 21.01.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/safe-funds-ep-debate-political-attack-election-interference-hungary-orban/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁵ Müller, P., & Slominski, P., *The soft hostage-taking of EU foreign policy: Hungary’s rule of law conflict with the EU and Russia’s war against Ukraine*, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2026, 33(3), 740-766, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2453033> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁶ *Putin’s GRU-linked Election Fixers Are Already in Budapest to Help Orbán*, 06.03.2026, <https://vsquare.org/putins-gru-linked-election-fixers-are-already-in-budapest-to-help-orban/> (access: 09.04.2026).

intelligence sources, with no official confirmation or denial issued by either any EU member state government or Washington at the time of writing.”⁸⁷

Echoing Szabolcs’s story, *The Washington Post*, left of center daily, published an article on March 21, 2026, claiming that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) had proposed a way to “fundamentally alter the entire paradigm of the election campaign” by “staging of an assassination attempt on Viktor Orbán.”⁸⁸ Reacting to *The Washington Post*’s report, Panyi wrote on social media: “The best is yet to come.”⁸⁹

In a twist, on 23 March 2026, the *Mandiner* reported that Szabolcs Panyi himself may have ties to foreign intelligence services, alleging that he had provided Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s phone number to the intelligence service of a European Union member state, enabling the monitoring of the minister’s calls. Panyi was also accused of having made recommendations staffing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the event of a TISZA Party election victory.⁹⁰ Zoltán Kovács, a spokesperson for the Hungarian government, called Panyi “a foreign asset in journalist’s clothing.”⁹¹

On 26 March 2026, Gergely Gulyás, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office, accused Panyi at a press conference of spying for Ukraine: “The Minister of Justice [was] authorized by the government to seek an expert opinion on the matter and to proceed as he sees fit. The Minister of Justice has informed the government that he will file a criminal complaint in the case on charges of espionage.”⁹² On 31 March 2026, the Századvég research institute published polling results reportedly indicating that “70 percent of respondents consider it unacceptable for a Hungarian journalist to cooperate with foreign intelligence services in a way that enables interference in Hungarian domestic politics.”⁹³ Panyi responded to the accusations, emphasizing in his statement:

⁸⁷ *Hungarian Opposition Calls on NATO to Intervene in Upcoming April Election*, 09.03.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/hungary-election-interference-nato-russia-ukraine-orban-magyar/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁸ *To tilt Hungarian election, Russians proposed staging assassination attempt*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/21/hungary-election-interference-russia-orban/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁸⁹ *Leaked Audio Reveals Foreign Intel Plot Targeting Hungary’s FM*, 23.03.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/leaked-audio-recording-hungary-peter-szijjarto-szabolcs-panyi-election/> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹⁰ *Külföldi szolgálatok egy magyar újságíró segítségével lehallgatták Szijjártó Pétert, a szalak Orbán Anitáig vezetnek*, 23.03.2026, <https://mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/03/botran-y-kulfoldi-titkosszolgalati-akcio-egy-magyar-ujsgiro-kozremukodesevel-a-szalak-a-tisza-partig-vezetnek> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹¹ *Szabolcs Panyi: the foreign asset in journalist’s clothing*, 23.03.2026, <https://abouthungary.hu/blog/szabolcs-panyi-the-foreign-asset-in-journalists-clothing> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹² *Gulyás Gergely: egyre több ukrán kém bukik le az országban*, 26.03.2026, <https://mti.hu/hirek/2026/03/26/gulyas-gergely-egyre-tobb-ukran-kem-bukik-le-az-orszagban> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹³ *A magyarok 70 százaléka elítéli Panyi Szabolcs tettét és a külföldi titkosszolgalati beavatkozást*, 31.03.2026, <https://szazadvég.hu/cikkek/a-magyarok-70-szazaleka-eliteli-panyi-szabolcs-tettet-es-a-kulfoldi-titkosszolgalati-beavatkozast/> (access: 09.04.2026).

“I have never engaged in espionage. I see my work as journalistic counterintelligence....”⁹⁴

5.5. Statements by high-ranking European Union officials constituting foreign interference

During the ongoing election campaign, senior European Union officials have made public statements about Hungary that many commentators have interpreted as indirect support for the Hungarian opposition.

As the most prominent institutional examples of attempted EU influence on the election, two opinions of the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union should be noted, both were published on 12 February 2026, and thus exactly nine days before the official start of the election campaign:

1. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 12 February 2026, in the dispute between the European Commission and Hungary (C-829/24).⁹⁵
2. Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta delivered on 12 February 2026, in the dispute between the European Parliament and European Commission (C-225/24).⁹⁶

Magyar Nemzet calls the CJEU's formulation of these opinions an attempt to interfere in the elections, explaining that “Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union stipulates that the proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European Union must be independent and impartial. According to the website's interpretation, if the court issues a judgment in such an important case in the middle of a campaign, it could also lead to a violation of this provision of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.”⁹⁷

On 16 March 2026, European Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier announced the introduction of a Rapid Response System (RRS) in the context of the ongoing election campaign in Hungary, declaring that the goal was to counter potential online disinformation campaigns conducted by the Russian Federation. As many as 44 entities have signed the agreement establishing the system. The Commission described it as a “voluntary system in which not only large platforms, such as TikTok and Meta, collaborate with fact-checkers and civil society organizations to ensure that, during the elections, potential interference or disinformation campaigns are quickly flagged.”

⁹⁴ *Statement on the Orbán Government Accusing Me, an Investigative Journalist, of Espionage*, 26.03.2026, <https://x.com/panyiszabolcs/status/2037245405293924475> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 12 February 2026, case C-829/24, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CC0829> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹⁶ Opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta delivered on 12 February 2026, case C-225/24, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CC0225> (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹⁷ *Beavatkozás a választásba: elmarasztalhatja Magyarországot az Európai Unió Bírósága*, 10.03.2026, <https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/2026/03/europai-unio-birosaga-magyarorszagot-elmarasztalhatja> (access: 09.04.2026).

According to the Commission, the mechanism would be active “until one week after the Hungarian elections.”⁹⁸

It should be noted that of the 44 signatories of The 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation (a full list of whom is available on the European Commission’s website),⁹⁹ about half of them do not have their headquarters in the European Union. The Commission indicated that “further details, including information about the organizations participating on the Hungarian side or about specific alerts, are expected to be provided later.”¹⁰⁰ However, even by the very end of the campaign, these details still had not been provided.

Just two days later, on 18 March 2026, *The Hungarian Conservative* reported that Facebook had begun restricting content from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.¹⁰¹ The outlet reported that the person allegedly responsible for this censorship was Oskar Braszczyński, a Polish manager at Meta, one of the 44 signatories of the RRS. Balázs Orbán, the head of Fidesz’s election campaign, corroborated these allegations on 29 March 2026, stating that numerous users had reported being unable to like Fidesz-related content on Facebook. However, Euronews, for example, reported that Balázs Orbán’s accusations were not supported by credible evidence.¹⁰²

On 20 March 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that “the EU will find ways to pay out the promised 90 billion euro (\$104.2 billion) loan to Ukraine despite Hungary’s ongoing resistance” because “we will deliver one way or the other.”¹⁰³ On the same day, Kaja Kallas, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said, referring to Hungary: “I guess, in the time of elections, people are not that rational.”¹⁰⁴ On March 25, 2026, Hungarian Foreign

⁹⁸ *EU activates system to combat online disinformation ahead of Hungarian elections*, 16.03.2026, https://www.ansa.it/nuova_europa/en/news/countries/hungary/2026/03/16/eu-activates-system-to-combat-online-disinformation-ahead-of-hungarian-elections_74cae43f-7468-4f88-b88c-daa92cd13000.html (access: 09.04.2026).

⁹⁹ *Signatories of the 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation*, 16.06.2022, <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/signatories-2022-strengthened-code-practice-disinformation> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰⁰ *Gyorsreagálású rendszert aktívál az Európai Bizottság az illegális online kampány ellen*, 16.03.2026, https://nepszava.hu/3315511_szijjarto-peter-baratsag-koolajvezetek-ukrajna (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰¹ *Facebook Restricts PM Orbán’s Content Weeks Ahead of Hungarian Election*, 18.03.2026, <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/facebook-meta-censorship-orban-hungary-election-2026/> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰² *Pro-Orbán actors accuse Meta of interference in Hungarian elections, despite lack of evidence*, 06.04.2026, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/06/pro-orban-actors-accuse-meta-of-interference-in-hungarian-elections-despite-lack-of-eviden> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰³ *EU will find ways to get loan to Ukraine, von der Leyen says*, 20.03.2026, <https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-will-find-ways-get-loan-ukraine-von-der-leyen-says-2026-03-20/> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰⁴ *‘Nobody can blackmail us’: Leaders excoriate Orbán’s veto as he tests EU limits*, 20.03.2026, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/20/nobody-can-blackmail-us-leaders-excoriate-orbans-veto-as-he-tests-eu-limits> (access: 09.04.2026).

Minister Péter Szijjártó described Kallas’s statement as an attempt to interfere in the election results.¹⁰⁵

On 30 March 2026, Politico published an article with a sensationalist lede: “EU countries are already weighing how to move ahead without Hungary if Viktor Orbán wins reelection.”¹⁰⁶ The article presented five possible scenarios in the event of another Fidesz victory, based on conversations with several EU senior diplomats who were granted “anonymity to speak freely” (the fact of these conversations is, of course, unverifiable). Only one of the scenarios involves the institutional separation of Hungary from the rest of the EU—an impossibility according to one anonymous diplomat. Instead, he points to an article by Derrick Wyatt published on Verfassungsblog on 26 March 2025. In it, the retired British professor outlines a scenario in which the remaining 26 member states would leave the European Union, leaving only Hungary behind.¹⁰⁷

The article's framing — particularly its headline — overstated the concreteness of the scenarios described, relying on conversations with anonymous diplomats whose authenticity cannot be verified. **Nonetheless**, a specific statement by EU Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law, and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath warrants attention. Although he did not mention Hungary by name, his warning was directed at that country: “This means that if breaches of the rule of law were to occur, the suspension of payments or blocking of funding is now on the table.”

5.6. Conclusions

The 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election campaign has confirmed that foreign interference remains a significant factor shaping the political environment. While the ruling Fidesz–KDNP benefited from open and vocal support expressed by leaders of several foreign political parties and governments, the European Union’s involvement has been dominated by institutional criticism, repeated parliamentary resolutions, and concrete operational measures (such as the Rapid Response System) whose timing and lack of transparency have been widely criticized in Budapest as disproportionate and politically motivated.

The legislative steps taken by the Hungarian authorities—from the 2023 law on the protection of national sovereignty to the work of the Sovereignty Protection Office—

¹⁰⁵ Szijjártó Péter keményen visszavágott Kaja Kallasnak: „Nagyon durva külföldi titkosszolgálati beavatkozás zajlik a magyar választásba”, 25.03.2026, <https://mandiner.hu/belfold/2026/03/szijjarto-peter-kemenyen-visszavagott-kaja-kallasnak-nagyon-durva-kulfoldi-titkosszolgالاتi-beavatkozas-zajlik-a-magyar-valasztasba> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰⁶ 5 ways the EU could cope with Hungary if Orbán wins again, 30.03.2026, <https://www.politico.eu/article/5-ways-the-eu-could-cope-with-hungary-if-orban-wins-again/> (access: 09.04.2026).

¹⁰⁷ Walking Out on Hungary. Collective Withdrawal and the New EU Treaties to Stand Up to Russia, 26.03.2025, <https://verfassungsblog.de/walking-out-on-hungary/> (access: 09.04.2026).

reflect a consistent effort to counter what they regard as systematic attempts at external influence. At the same time, mutual accusations involving Russian and Ukrainian intelligence services have added a further layer of complexity, although these claims largely remain unproven or contested in the public domain.

Ultimately, the campaign has highlighted the tension between Hungary's assertion of national sovereignty and democratic autonomy on the one hand, and the proactive engagement of European Union actors on the other. Whether the latter remains within the bounds of legitimate political dialogue or crosses into impermissible interference continues to be a subject of significant legal and political debate.

6. Liberty Coalition for Free and a Fair Election

Liberty Coalition for a Free and Fair Election (LCFFE) has been established as an international election observation mission to safeguard the integrity of Hungary’s elections, overseeing the transparency, legality, and integrity of the electoral process and the parliamentary elections.

LCFFE has been monitoring the electoral process and the April 12 elections with a team of 86 members, including an expert core group.

The monitoring activities of the Liberty Coalition for a Free and Fair Election (LCFFE, hereinafter “Liberty Coalition”) has been focused on the lawful conduct of the elections, as well as on assessing whether Hungarian voters are able to express their political will freely, under democratic conditions and without undue influence, and whether the election results faithfully reflect the will of the people.

LCFFE Core Team

Anna	Wellisz	Core Team, Co-Chair
Jerzy Adam	Kwaśniewski	Core Team, Co-Chair
Pawel Andrzej	Lisicki	Core Team
Chad Clifford	Pecknold	Core Team
Ricardo Antonio	Ruiz de la Serna	Core Team
Aurelia	Skipwith	Core Team
Carla Herd	Sands	Core Team
Massimiliano	Ferrari	Core Team
Leonardo Gabriel	Orlando Faus	Core Team
Patryk Stanisław	Ignaszczak	Core Team, Secretary

LCFFE Observers

Davide	Adornetto	Observer
Alejandro	Adsuar Meseguer	Observer
Aleksander	Arabadzić	Observer
Jincy	Arthungal	Observer
Constance Marie Amélie	Avenel	Observer
Manuel Maan	Baghdi	Observer
Stephen	Balogh	Observer
Nikodem Jan	Bernaciak	Observer
Stefano Davide	Bettera	Observer
Sebastian Maciej	Bojemski	Observer
Ana Isabel	Bolio Garcia	Observer
Louis-Marie	Bonneau	Observer
Erik	Bootsma	Observer

Eduardo Alfonso	Cader Peña	Observer
Unai Cano Gómez	Cano Gómez	Observer
Francesco	Carraro	Observer
Milan	Čavić	Observer
Christian	Collins	Observer
Rodrigo Ivan	Cortes Jimenez	Observer
Daniel Ja'acov	de Liever	Observer
Jarosław Jerzy	Duś	Observer
Ellen Kryger	Fantini	Observer
Peter	Finocchio	Observer
Miguel Ángel	García López	Observer
Pawel	Gierech	Observer
Erick Daniel	Gonzalez Neri	Observer
Thomas	Grischany	Observer
Aleksa	Grubežić	Observer
Álvaro	Gutiérrez Valladares	Observer
Shelley	Gwartney	Observer
Kathryn Duvall	Huth	Observer
Olimpia Maria	Jabłońska-Kraska	Observer
Nikola	Kedhi	Observer
Oskar Przemysław	Kida	Observer
Emmanouil	Koulas	Observer
Bogdan Stanisław	Kowalski	Observer
Marzena Maria	Kożyczkowska	Observer
Filip	Łapiński	Observer
María Victoria	Lara García-Brioles	Observer
Alarico	Lazzaro	Observer
Eric William Payne	Lee	Observer
Jan Rafael	Lupoměský	Observer
Terra	MacAloney	Observer
Marco	Malaguti	Observer
Ernest Cezary	Michalowski	Observer
Sikuku Tobias	Nauruki	Observer
Jesse Harry	Ndambala	Observer
Mario	Noya Montañez	Observer
Sean	O'Donnell	Observer
Paul	Orfanedes	Observer
Justin	Ouimette	Observer
Łukasz	Paczesny	Observer
Lukáš	Parížek	Observer
Ignacio	Pastor Puebla	Observer
Jay	Patel	Observer
Krešimir	Pleić	Observer
Anca Ramona	Pop	Observer
Robert David	Popper	Observer

Jeffrey	Popper	Observer
Ioannis	Poultsidis	Observer
Taylor	Ragg	Observer
Antoine	Renard	Observer
Silvia	Roberto	Observer
Miguel	Rovira de la Fuente	Observer
Juan Manuel	Sayago Guzmán	Observer
Candela Sol	Silva	Observer
Aleksandra Wiktoria	Siwek	Observer
Lauren	Stutzman	Observer
Wiktor Krzysztof	Szydlik	Observer
Shane	Trejo	Observer
Beata	Trochanowska	Observer
Stephan Alexander	Willenig	Observer
Jacek	Wygoda	Observer
Konrad Kamil	Wytrykowski	Observer
Kristen	Zicarelli	Observer