Local elections in Georgia without disruptions – report by Ordo Iuris observers

Georgians elect local government officials. 

On Saturday, October 4, 2025, representatives of the Ordo Iuris Institute took part in the observation of the local elections, visiting polling stations in Tbilisi and surrounding towns. This was another observation mission involving representatives of the Institute—in 2022, the Institute organized a large-scale, international observation mission during the parliamentary elections in Hungary, while in 2024 Ordo Iuris experts observed the parliamentary elections in Georgia.

In this year’s local elections in Georgia, citizens elected members of 64 legislative and executive local government bodies for a four-year term, including the mayor of the country’s capital, Tbilisi. Voting was possible at one of the 3,051 polling stations set up in public buildings throughout the country. During this year’s observation mission, the delegates visited a dozen or so polling places in Tbilisi and in neighboring towns. 

An important backdrop to this year’s local elections is a protracted political conflict centered on a dispute between the “Georgian Dream” party, which has governed the country since 2012, and the divided opposition, coalescing around an alliance of parties operating under the name “Strong Georgia,” as well as other political groups. Opposition political parties accuse “Georgian Dream” of, among other things, undermining democracy and breaking the law.

Ultimately, 17 political parties filed applications with the Central Election Commission to register for the local elections, of which 14 were approved (the remaining 3 groups were not registered because they did not meet the requirements prescribed by law). Meanwhile, several major opposition parties, including Unity – National Movement and the Coalition for Change, decided to boycott Saturday’s vote in protest against the actions of the Georgian government. 

The Electoral system in Georgia 

On October 4, the citizens of Georgia elected both members of the representative bodies of local self-government, known as Sakrebulo, and the heads of the executive bodies of 64 local self-government units (5 self-governing cities and 59 municipalities).

The legal framework for holding local elections consists of several legal acts, primarily the Constitution of Georgia and the Election Code. Political groups interested in participating in local government elections have been given the ability to submit party lists (registration) electronically. Over the past year, many changes have been made to Georgia’s election law. After the October 2024 parliamentary elections, among other things, as many as 8 packages of amendments to the Electoral Code were adopted.  These changes included, among other things, raising the electoral threshold in the Sakrebulo elections from 2.5% to 4% in Tbilisi and from 3% to 4% in other municipalities. The candidate who receives the highest number of valid votes in the respective single-member district is elected as a member of the Sakrebulo under a first-past-the-post system.

Deliberative bodies of local self-government units (Sakrebulo) consist of 15 members elected by proportional representation and one member from each locality (village, town, or city) in the territory subject to first-past-the-post voting. In addition, in the administrative centers of local government communities with more than 4,000 voters, there shall be established no fewer than two and no more than five single-member districts.

The executive bodies of local government communities (mayors) are, however, elected for a four-year term in direct elections. They are elected in two rounds. Candidates for mayor may be nominated by a registered political party or by a group of voters consisting of at least five members.

Media

In the OSCE report on the previous (parliamentary) elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe noted that the media landscape in this country is highly polarized, that the media operate under difficult financial conditions, with an insufficient advertising market, and are largely dependent on political and business interests, which is contrary to international standards. It was also pointed out that a large proportion of television stations devoted most of their news coverage of the election campaign to Georgian Dream. As noted in the report, the stations GPB, Formula, Imedi, Mtavari Channel, Rustavi 2, and TV Pirveli devoted, respectively, 61, 56, 82, 52, 80, and 51 percent of their coverage to the ruling party’s election campaign. On the Formula channel, 89% of coverage of the ruling Georgian Dream’s campaign had a negative tone, while 88% of coverage of the opposition Coalition for Change’s campaign had a positive tone. At the same time, in the content presented on the Mtavari channel, 90% of the coverage concerning Georgian Dream had a negative tone, while 82% of the coverage concerning the Coalition for Change was positive.

Due to the circumstances outlined below (the absence of an observation mission), the OSCE did not prepare a report on Georgia’s local elections, which makes assessing the more recent media situation in Georgia considerably more difficult. Other organizations, such as e.g. Amnesty International, have in turn argued that the media are currently “being silenced through restrictive regulations and a wide range of legal measures” (including through inspections and interrogations).

Integrated Electronic Election System 

In the context of the recent elections in Georgia, the use of an integrated electronic electoral system merits special mention as it encompasses electronic voter authentication, the casting and counting of votes, and the secure transmission of results nationwide. The purpose of this system is to simplify electoral procedures, enhance ballot secrecy, and reduce the likelihood of errors or election interference. It is worth noting that, for the first time in Georgia, electronic technologies were used during the parliamentary elections held in October 2024. 

The integrated electronic voting system was supplied by the company Smartmatic – an entity with a recognized international reputation, involved over the past two decades in supporting elections in countries such as Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Ecuador, Estonia, the Philippines, Mexico, Singapore, the United States, Venezuela, the United Kingdom, and Italy. In the United States, it is worth noting that Smartmatic provided voting-support software in Los Angeles during the 2020 presidential election. Before the elections, Giorgi Kalandarishvili, the chair of the Georgian Central Election Commission, praised the advantages of this system pointing out that “there is no risk of a cyberattack because the devices used for electronic voting are not connected to the Internet.” However, this system was criticized, among others, by American conservative circles over its use in the 2020 presidential election in the County of Los Angeles.  Supporters of Donald Trump accused the corporation of fraud in favor of his opponent, Democrat Joe Biden. However, the allegations were not proven. It is worth noting that over the past twenty years, systems developed by Smartmatic have been used in elections in many different countries, such as Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Ecuador, Estonia, the Philippines, Mexico, Singapore, the United States, Venezuela, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

How did the local elections in Georgia unfold?

Representatives of the Ordo Iuris Institute arrived at the first electoral commission (Commission No. 38) a few minutes after the polling stations opened, which occurred exactly at 8:00 a.m. local time (6:00 a.m. Polish time). During the observation, the Institute’s delegates had the opportunity to observe the voting procedure carried out using an electronic voter registration support system.

Lists of eligible voters were posted outside polling places so that any interested person could confirm that they are registered and able to vote at that particular polling place. The voter’s identity was verified twice—upon entering the polling place, and then at the ballot distribution desk, after which additional checks were performed by placing the identity document against special devices equipped with magnetic readers. Upon completing verification, the aforementioned machines printed a confirmation of this fact that resembled a receipt.  The printed confirmation was then signed by the voter, whose identity had been verified, and afterward deposited into one of the sealed, individually numbered small containers located on the tables at those stations. 

Ballots were issued in special cardboard folders that prevented unauthorized persons from seeing voters’ choices. Next, voters proceeded behind a cardboard partition, where they could anonymously cast their vote for the political party or candidate of their choice.

At each of the polling stations visited, there was a stationary camera aimed at the devices used to scan and collect ballots. 

No observers from the OSCE

It is also worth noting that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe issued a statement, in which it stated that the Georgian authorities’ invitation to observe the local elections, sent too late (one month prior), made it impossible to conduct a credible and reliable observation mission. 

“Regrettably, the Georgian authorities’ decision to invite us at such a late stage prevents meaningful observation, and ODIHR will not be in a position to deploy an election observation mission. We nonetheless hope to continue our longstanding co-operation with Georgia’s institutions and civil society to strengthen democracy and human rights,” wrote Maria Telalian, the OSCE director. 

It is worth noting that at each of the dozen or so election commissions visited by the Ordo Iuris delegation, the identities of observers, including the Institute’s delegates, were verified—members of the election commissions checked observers’ ID cards and identification badges and recorded the presence of observation missions in the documents of the respective commission. The large number of observers in each of the polling stations visited also drew attention, many of whom had been delegated to this role by opposition parties.

Conclusions and potential issues

While observing the voting process, the Institute’s delegates noted that fixed cameras, installed in each polling station and aimed at the devices used to scan and collect ballots, were often poorly positioned. The cameras were set up on stands about 1 meter tall, and the space between these cameras and the devices used for scanning and collecting votes was often very busy, so the view they were recording could very easily be obscured for shorter or longer periods. An better solution would be to mount such cameras at an appropriate height (e.g., on a wall or under the ceiling) so that they cover a larger area. Such a solution would allow for greater transparency in elections.  

In one of the polling stations, the Ordo Iuris Institute’s observers also noted that the cardboard privacy screens intended to guarantee anonymity while voting were not tall enough to ensure full privacy when marking candidates on the ballots. Theoretically, under such circumstances, people standing in line for the table with a cardboard privacy screen, being in close proximity to a voter casting a ballot, could, in extreme cases, see that voter’s electoral choices. Therefore, it is crucial that in the upcoming elections the cardboard privacy screens be of sufficient height to guarantee the complete secrecy of the vote in all polling places.

Apart from the objections indicated above, none of the dozen or so polling stations visited in Tbilisi and nearby towns recorded any problems or incidents that could suggest or indicate irregularities during the elections. 

On election day, protests took place in the country, including tumultuous demonstrations. In the country’s capital, Tbilisi, protesters tried to storm the presidential palace, calling for “power to be handed back to the people”. The police used pepper spray and water cannons to disperse the crowd that was trying to enter the head of state’s residence. Demonstrators built barricades using the furnishings of restaurants and bars, from behind which they pelted police officers with fireworks and stones. The media reported on the detention of some demonstrators. In addition, the Ministry of Health there reported that 21 Interior Ministry officers and 6 demonstrators were hospitalized as a result of injuries.

Georgian Dream wins the elections

Ultimately, Georgian Dream received as much as 81.7% support, while the next opposition parties, Strong Georgia and For Georgia (a coalition of parties), received 6.7% and 3.7% support, respectively. The remaining parties and groups received less than 3%. Kakha Kaladze, the candidate of Georgian Dream who has been in office since 2017, was re-elected as mayor of Tbilisi with 71.5% of the vote. Voter turnout was 40.93 percent and was lower than in the previous local elections. The lowest turnout was recorded in the capital, where 31.08 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots.

In a post-election commentary Wojciech Górecki, an analyst at Poland’s Center for Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich), noted that the local elections strengthened Georgian Dream’s position. As he emphasized, “Its [Georgian Dream’s] successive, ever greater victories are, on the one hand, the result of effective messaging. The party managed to convince a significant portion of the public that it guarantees peace—while its opponents would drag Georgia into war—and, on the other hand, a stable economic situation (…).” The cited author also notes that “any possible irregularities on the day of the vote itself probably did not have a significant impact on its results.” The boycott, declared by some opposition parties, was, in his view, most likely intended to cover up an expected spectacular defeat, although the stated reason was a refusal to endorse a “Russian special operation», as the pro-Western opposition and the former president called these elections. 

Summary

During the observation mission, representatives of the Ordo Institute visited a dozen or so polling stations in Tbilisi and neighboring towns.  By observing the electoral process on-site, Ordo Iuris delegates could see that the October local elections were conducted in an orderly manner. The identities of citizens wishing to cast their ballots at the October local election polling places were thoroughly verified by members of the election commissions, which included double-checking ID cards/passports and holding identity documents up to devices equipped with a special magnetic stripe reader. It is worth noting that the election process was supported by an integrated electronic voting system that included electronic voter authentication, vote casting and counting, and the secure transmission of results nationwide, provided by Smartmatic. 

The Institute’s delegates identified and documented certain issues that should not recur in future elections. Among these was the fact that static cameras installed in each polling station and aimed at devices for scanning and collecting ballots were often positioned poorly. The cameras were set up on stands about 1 meter tall, and the space between these cameras and the devices used for scanning and collecting votes was often very busy, so the view they were recording could very easily be obscured for shorter or longer periods. 

Moreover, at one polling place, experts pointed out that the cardboard privacy screens designed to guarantee anonymity when casting votes were not tall enough to ensure complete privacy when marking candidates on the ballots. Theoretically, under such circumstances, people standing in line for the table with a cardboard privacy screen, being in close proximity to a voter casting a ballot, could, in extreme cases, see that voter’s electoral choices. 

The above problems—the first systemic in nature, the second observed only at one of the polling places visited—should be eliminated so that they do not recur in any future elections. 

Patryk Ignaszaczak – analyst at the Ordo Iuris Center for International Law.