“EU Values” as a Weapon – How the European Commission Discriminates Against Conservative, Patriotic, and Christian NGOs

Civil Society Strategy

In the political guidelines for the European Commission for 2024–2029, Ursula von der Leyen committed to intensifying cooperation with civil society organizations and to providing them with EU support and protection in their daily work.¹ As a result, on November 12, 2025, the European Commission published the “EU Strategy for Civil Society” (hereinafter: “the Strategy”).²

The document’s assumptions can be read as giving effect to the principle in Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union³, whereby EU institutions should cooperate with civil society through an open, transparent, and regular dialogue and conduct their activities as openly as possible in order to ensure the inclusive and active participation of civil society. The Commission also states that “engagement with civil society is a cornerstone of EU policymaking.”

Unfortunately, a careful reading of the Strategy leads to the conclusion that the European Commission’s primary intention is to support organizations with a specific political and ideological profile, while simultaneously restricting access to funding and creating an atmosphere of boycott and stigmatization of organizations that oppose the left-wing agenda pursued by the EU.

Cooperation between the European Commission and civil society – a new platform

The Strategy defines civil society organizations (CSOs) as “all non-State, not-for-profit, independent, non-partisan and nonviolent organisations, through which people pursue and defend shared objectives and ideals”.

The European Commission declares that civil society engagement is a foundation of EU policymaking, and its goal is to strengthen the effective and meaningful engagement of civil society as a partner in governance.

But is the EU really open to civil society as a whole? The strategy strongly emphasizes the “EU values”, which are particularly focused on equality, inclusivity, and fundamental rights, into which EU officials readily include the right to abortion or privileges for people who identify with the LGBT movement. In the strategy, invoking “EU values” interpreted through the lens of left-liberal ideology naturally marginalizes, from the top down, organizations that espouse conservative views or defend life and the family. That lack of neutrality stems from the selective definition of “EU values” and control mechanisms that may favor groups aligned with the mainstream EU narrative. This is the case, among other things, regarding the “Civil Society Platform”.

In Section 2.1. In the strategy, the Commission announces the launch in 2026 of a “Civil Society Platform.” It is intended to facilitate “ exchanges on the objectives of the Strategy to strengthen engagement, support, and protection,” as well as to “allow for timely and meaningful input to policy development, and on funding.” To increase the visibility and accessibility of information and to facilitate the engagement of civil society organizations in activities, the Commission will create a website dedicated to the civil society platform, where it will publish information and resources related to the platform’s work, as well as information on the Commission’s dialogues with civil society in other policy areas. This will enable organizations to easily search for information, deadlines, and participation requirements, as well as opportunities to express interest in participating in various dialogues. Within the framework of the platform, the Commission will also organize an annual summit together with the EESC (European Economic and Social Committee) to develop synergies among ongoing dialogues and discuss strategic priorities.

The description of the new platform sounds promising, until the Strategy specifies that the platform is to provide a “regular and structured” framework for cooperation, but “in particular” with organizations “working on promoting democracy, the rule of law, equality and fundamental rights, in line with the Political Guidelines” (point 1 of the Strategy), and the so-called “dialogue on EU values” de facto excludes any criticism of them (or of their left-wing interpretation), since this dialogue is simply meant to seal the status quo: „streamlining and strengthening engagement on fundamental rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (point. 2.1.).

Guiding principles for cooperation

The strategy proposed 10 guiding principles for dialogue between the Commission and civil society. Particularly interesting is Principle No. 5 – Representation. In it, the Commission states that the “selection of participants should be based on the organisations’ independence, legitimacy, representativeness and expertise, as well as their adherence to EU values.”

It is worth noting that the way this rule is framed allows the rejection of any prospective participant—regardless of their credentials, representation of a particular group, or even expertise—if they are deemed insufficiently committed to “EU values.” However, a left-liberal interpretation of “EU values” allows one to conclude that anyone who voices opposition, or even doubt, regarding the EU’s migration or equality policies, depriving the unborn of the right to life, or restricting freedom of speech is opposing those values. Already at this stage, the Commission thus leaves a clear loophole to exclude a substantial portion of society from the dialogue — namely those who hold views other than those currently dominant in the EU.

However, the problems with the principle of representativeness do not end there; it should also be understood in the context of Principle No. 6—Inclusivity. The principle of integration states that the dialogue should take into account groups that are “underrepresented, marginalized or in vulnerable situations”. In light of Principle 5, these groups should be represented. The strategy does not specify which groups are meant, but refers (footnote no. 16) to examples of countries where several consultative bodies have been established, whose membership includes civil society organizations, to advise the government in various areas, and there it also explicitly points to “national minorities” and “LGBTIQ+ equality.” This makes the Commission’s intentions quite unambiguous regarding the “marginalized” and “underrepresented” groups and interests it would like to see in its debates. We can therefore expect the representation of “LGBT people,” illegal migrants, or a “women’s faction” as a sex allegedly subjected to systemic discrimination.

The strategy, however, does not mention religious groups anywhere, which—one might think—fit perfectly into the definition of “marginalized” groups in today’s Europe. It is also difficult to find a civil society organization representing “ordinary people,” who undoubtedly constitute the largest interest group, both in individual countries and in the EU as a whole. This group could, to a large extent, be represented by conservative-leaning organizations; however, these organizations are very likely to be sidelined from the dialogue as “opposing” what the European Commission interprets as “EU values.”

This means that de facto as civil society, those who will speak out will primarily be people with extreme views (like far-left feminist organizations) concerning a marginal part of society (LGBT)⁴ or people who are guests in our country and should not have any possibility of influencing the shaping of law and policy at all (migrants).

Protection and censorship

In point 3 of the Strategy, the Commission argues that a “a thriving civic space requires an enabling legal, administrative, and regulatory environment, where CSOs are supported and empowered, and where they are protected and can operate freely.”

As with the platform intended to serve dialogue, the measures put in place to “protect” civil society organizations are de facto tools that the EC will be able to use to promote some organizations and silence others. Everything will, however, take place under the guise of “protection.”

As the European Commission states in point 3.1. In the Strategy, “stakeholders report about measures that in their view restrict the environment in which CSOs and HRDs (human rights defenders) operate.” These barriers and threats include, among others, disproportionate and burdensome registration requirements, unfair tax or financial reporting regulations, impediments to accessing financing, unjustified obstacles to using financial services, and legal requirements that restrict cross-border operations, or so-called strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP).

Lawsuits referred to as “SLAPP” are clearly baseless or abusive legal proceedings that are primarily intended to wear down the defendant, including financially.⁵ The EU has for many years pledged to combat such lawsuits. At the same time, this phenomenon is also used to smear entities that, while fighting the left-wing agenda and disinformation, are trying to seek justice in court. The Ordo Iuris Institute has repeatedly been accused of purportedly bringing SLAPP-type lawsuits in situations where well-founded cases concerning violations of the personal rights of the Institute, its employees, donors, or beneficiaries were pending before the court.

The European Commission’s announcement of continued efforts in this area may indicate that, in addition to attempts at the systemic restriction of the right of access to the courts, we can also expect the Commission to impose a general isolation of those organizations that, in the EU’s assessment, use SLAPPs.

It is worth noting how much attention the Commission and “stakeholders” devote to issues of financing and cross-border activities. The explanation for this phenomenon is, however, simple — a great many organizations with a left-wing and “human-rights” profile are funded from abroad. A number of organizations of this kind have for years resisted legal measures designed to limit the ability to obtain funding from abroad, as well as to introduce transparency for funds obtained in this way.

The EU itself is extremely reluctant about Member States introducing regulations that require the disclosure of foreign sources of funding, particularly by organizations that present themselves as social or civic. Regulations of this type are in effect e.g., in Hungary, where non-governmental organizations funded from abroad or in a non-transparent manner are treated with great caution. Under the law on the transparency of organizations supported from abroad, organizations receiving more than 7,200,000 forints from outside the country are classified as foreign-supported and are required to register in a special registry and to label all materials they produce with information about foreign support—under penalty of a fine and, in case of repeated breaches, dissolution⁶.

The debate about such regulations has been taking place in the public sphere for several years now, and the EU has consistently opposed their introduction.⁷ Criticism of regulations intended to compel entities whose operations and materials are financed from foreign sources to transparently disclose that fact is all the more surprising, given that the EU at the same time vocally advocates combating disinformation and propaganda.

Currently — in light of, among other things, the findings from the report by Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC)⁸, which revealed how the European Commission, by financing “independent” non-governmental organizations and research centers, supported its own propaganda⁹—questioning the legitimacy of such procedures intended to limit the influence of “foreign agents,” hiding under the guise of independent non-governmental organizations, seems all the more necessary.

New strategy, old financing method

The way the European Commission is trying, in the Strategy, to support civil society—while simultaneously separating a significant part of it from any form of protection and support—aligns with the findings reached by the MCC in February 2025. The aforementioned MCC report indicates that in recent years the European Commission has provided enormous sums—billions of euros—to non-governmental organizations and think tanks for purposes related to promoting “pro-EU” and pro-immigration attitudes. The EU, under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Program, was to allocate $1.8 billion to promote “EU values,” understood primarily as “supranational integration.” Enormous funds were also allocated to promoting liberal-progressive ideologies and to projects that openly attack the democratic governments of Poland and Hungary¹⁰.

In Section 4 of the Strategy, which specifically addresses the issue of financing, the European Commission explicitly and with undisguised pride announces its intention to continue such activities. The Commission itself admits that a number of organizations are entirely dependent on it, and the entities it funds are organizations aligned with the values espoused by eurocrats: “The CERV programme occupies a unique space in the CSO funding landscape as it is often the only source of funding available to CSOs working on fundamental rights and values in the EU.”

Point 4 of the Strategy also explicitly states that “strong safeguards are in place to ensure that any entities and projects whose objectives are incompatible with EU values do not receive support.” To further strengthen these safeguards and requirements, the Commission also “committed to consider the feasibility of adding risk indicators to strengthen EU values compliance checks.”

The European Commission’s intention to cut organizations with a broadly defined conservative or Eurosceptic profile off from funding was thus expressed very directly in the Strategy. This is also consistent with the shape of the new EU budget, which sets “respect for the rule of law” as a condition for access to EU funds. An EU budget structured this way means further blocking of EU funds and an intensification of the already widespread acts of political blackmail against Poland and other member states. As announced in the Strategy, the same mechanism will be observed in the area of funding for civil society organizations.

Public consultations

Before adopting the document in July 2025, the European Commission held public consultations, during which the Ordo Iuris Institute submitted its opinion on the “EU Strategy for Civil Society” initiative and its potential future form¹¹.

At that time, the Ordo Iuris Institute pointed out, among other things, the need to increase the transparency of funding rules for civil society organizations. Given the final form of the Strategy, it is safe to say that promoting a left-wing interpretation of “EU values” is much more important to the Commission than transparency regarding the funding of the entities that engage in this propaganda.

In the opinion submitted to the European Commission, Ordo Iuris also emphasized the need to establish mechanisms whereby civil society organizations, regardless of their ideological profile and the activities they undertake, would be able to apply for and receive funds from the European Union budget on equal terms.

Also in this respect, the Strategy leaves no doubt that the European Commission’s objective is entirely different. Neither entities nor projects whose aims are “incompatible with EU values” will receive support. While such an approach may be understandable in the case of a private entity pursuing policy on its own terms, in the case of the European Union—an organization whose values have simply been appropriated by left-wing ideology—a declaration of this kind is entirely unacceptable.

Undemocratic strategy

The EU strategy for civil society is not a document aimed at genuine dialogue. In key areas crucial to the functioning of civil society—funding and the right to “be heard”—the Strategy will act as a tool of ideological selection. “EU values” are once again being used as a pretext to censor and stigmatize those who dare to question the current form of the EU.

As a result, instead of strengthening democracy, this document fosters further polarization, purging all pluralism from public debate. This is what the EU’s “open civic space” looks like.

Anna Kubacka – analyst at the Ordo Iuris Center for International Law.

1 Europe’s Choice. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf, (accessed: November 26, 2025).

2Source: EC, Communication on the EU Strategy for Civil Society, https://commission.europa.eu/document/8c30975d-bc1c-4415-8dcd-a71cb28f3662_en, (accessed: November 25, 2025).

3 Treaty on European Union ( Official Journal of 2004, No. 90, item 864/30, as amended), hereinafter: “TUE”

4 The average percentage of people identifying as “LGBT+” in the EU is only 9 percent of adults. Cf. IPSOS, LGBT+ Pride 2023, A 30-Country Ipsos Global Advisor Survey, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-05/Ipsos%20LGBT+%20Pride%202023%20Global%20Survey%20Report%20-%20rev.pdf, (accessed: December 02, 2025).

5 For more on SLAPP lawsuits and the current state of the law, see. J. Książek, The anti-SLAPP directive may contribute to the stifling public debate, February 24, 2024, https://ordoiuris.pl/en/press-newsdesk/anti-slapp-directive-may-contribute-to-stifling-public-debate/, (accessed: December 03, 2025).

6 See NGO.pl, M. Łojkowska, Court of Justice of the EU: Hungarian law on NGOs receiving support from abroad incompatible with EU law (in Polish), June 18, 2020, https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/trybunal-sprawiedliwosci-ue-wegierska-ustawa-o-organizacjach-pozarzadowych-otrzymujacych-wsparcie-z-zagranicy-niezgodna-z-prawem-unijnym, accessed: December 03, 2025). Much stricter regulations apply in Russia, where the so-called law on foreign agents is in force. It requires anyone who receives “support” from outside Russia or is “under the influence” from outside Russia to register as a “foreign agent.” Registered entities are subject to additional audits and are required to label all their publications with a comprehensive disclaimer stating that they are distributed by a “foreign agent” (see OSW, M. Domańska, Law on “undesirable” organizations: Russia deepens its self-isolation, May 27, 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-05-27/law-undesirable-organisations-russia-deepens-its-self-isolation, accessed: December 03, 2025).

7 See, for example, European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the repeated attempts in Georgia to adopt a law on foreign agents and the resulting restrictions on civil society (2024/2703(RSP)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0381_PL.html, (accessed: December 04, 2025).

8 MCC, T. Fazi, The EU’s propaganda machine: How the EU funds NGOs to promote itself, https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/efbecea2012e33f88794130dae1b7a38d3778bcb.pdf, (accessed: March 04, 2025).

9 See Ordo Iuris comment: T. Fazi, The EU’s propaganda machine, March 18, 2025, https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/efbecea2012e33f88794130dae1b7a38d3778bcb.pdf, (accessed: May 18, 2025).

10 See more. T. Fazi, The EU’s propaganda machine MCC Report, February 2025, https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/efbecea2012e33f88794130dae1b7a38d3778bcb.pdf/, (accessed: November 27, 2025).

11 Opinion of the Ordo Iuris Institute on the “Strategy for Civil Society” (in Polish), https://ordoiuris.pl/informacje-prasowe/komisja-europejska-nie-moze-dzialac-w-nietransparentny-sposob-opinia-ordo-iuris-w-sprawie-strategii-ue-na-rzecz-spoleczenstwa-obywatelskiego/, (accessed: December 03, 2025).