Constitutional Tribunal Appointments in Poland: Rule-of-Law Implications of a Flawed Sejm Vote

On March 13, 2026, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland elected 6 individuals to fill 6 vacant judgeships at the Constitutional Tribunal[1]: Maciej Taborowski[2], Dariusz Szostek[3], Krystian Markiewicz[4], Anna Korwin-Piotrowska,[5] Marcin Dziurda,[6] and Magdalena Bentkowska[7]. Pursuant to Article 2(2) of the Act of November 30, 2016 on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal[8], the election procedure is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm[9], including in particular its Article 30. As a result of the aforementioned selection, there were violations of the procedure at issue. The purpose of this analysis is to discuss the scale of these violations, consider their consequences, and propose solutions.

I. Breach of the deadline for nominating candidates

Pursuant to Article 30(3)(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, candidates for the office of judge of the Constitutional Tribunal must be nominated no later than 30 days before the end of the term of office. Such a submission may be made only by the Presidium of the Sejm or by at least 50 members of the Sejm. This deadline was not met for any of the six vacancies currently on the Tribunal, either by any group of MPs from the current ruling coalition or by the Presidium of the Sejm, in which the coalition holds a majority.[10] The only candidates, nominated by the Law and Justice parliamentary group, did not secure the required majority in the votes held on February 21, 2025, May 9, 2025, September 12, 2025, and January 23, 2026.

On March 9, pursuant to Article 30(3)(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm[11], the Speaker of the Sejm, Włodzimierz Czarzasty, set March 11 as the deadline for further submission of nominations for judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.[12]

The above situation is unprecedented. To date, it has never happened that a stable majority in the Sejm failed to nominate candidates to the Constitutional Tribunal by the required deadline and, as a result, failed to make the selection for no clear reason. Instances of a failure to elect before the expiration of a term of office, and consequently the creation of a vacancy in the Constitutional Tribunal, have of course occurred; however, setting aside cases of death or resignation during the term, they resulted from various unforeseen circumstances and involved one, at most two, seats. For example, at the end of 2006, the Sejm elected a judge to only one of the 3 seats being vacated—this, however, was due to a crisis in the then-ruling majority and, consequently, the nominated candidates’ failure to secure sufficient support.[13] In 2010 as well, on two occasions, no judge was elected to fill the seat being vacated, but this was because on both occasions the governing majority’s candidates unexpectedly withdrew after the deadline for submitting applications and before the vote.[14]

However, can the foregoing irregularity lead to a finding that the selection is invalid? On the one hand, accepting that the Sejm could simply choose not to elect judges to the Constitutional Tribunal raises serious doubts. The Sejm’s obligation to elect judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (TK), and the prohibition on artificially creating or extending vacancies, were explicitly emphasized by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of December 3, 2015, in case K 34/15.[15] Granting the Sejm such a power would seriously disrupt the constitutional separation of powers, because it would indirectly give the legislative branch (whose actions are subject to review by the Constitutional Tribunal, which has the power to remove defective provisions from the legal order) the ability to effectively remove the Constitutional Tribunal from the constitutional framework by consistently failing to elect judges until the Tribunal’s bench is vacated.

On the other hand, the question arises as to what consequences would result from the absence of such a choice, as well as from any delay in making it, and how it should be remedied. Recognizing that in such a case the term of office is shortened would be contrary both to Article 194(1) of the Constitution and to the entire practice to date, under which the term was calculated either from the date of election (until 2015[16]) or from the taking of the oath—(since 2015[17], the change in practice could have resulted, among other things, from the holdings of judgment K 34/15[18]).

Conversely, to hold that, having once failed to nominate candidates, a given majority can no longer nominate them again under Article 30(3)(5) of the Rules of Procedure—i.e., within the additional deadline set by the Speaker—would lead to a conclusion contrary to the principle of legislative rationality, according to which it would not be possible to remedy a potential defect, namely the failure to submit a nomination and hold the election within the prescribed time. At the same time, it is impossible to determine how long this impossibility would persist.

It should also be noted that the allegation that the Sejm did not specify which candidate was elected to which seat is unfounded. Until now, this has never been described that way. If several candidates were elected for seats due to become vacant on the same day, it was not specified who would replace whom, but only when the term of office would begin.[19] If, however, the election was to fill a seat that had already been vacated, then no start date of the term of office was specified in the resolution at all[20], because, as indicated above, it began on the day of the election (until 2015) or on the day of the swearing-in (since 2015).

Also, something of a precedent—at least under the current Constitution—is the election of 6 Constitutional Tribunal judges by a particular majority at once. The last time such a large number of judges were elected at once was on November 17, 1993.[21] However, the provisions of the Constitutional Tribunal Act then in force provided for exactly such a collective procedure for election.[22] After the Constitution entered into force, there was one instance of the simultaneous election of 4 judges to the Constitutional Tribunal – on November 13, 2001[23], whereas 3 judges were elected at a time on multiple occasions – the most recent on November 21, 2019.[24] This is because, when introducing the principle of individual terms of office for judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Constitution did not in any way individualize the terms of office of judges already elected under the prior provisions. Thus, the actual individualization resulted from the deaths or resignations of individual judges, or from the failure to elect a new judge before the end of the predecessor’s term.

Taking all of the above into account, although the governing majority’s practice in question is not commendable from the standpoint of good parliamentary practice in the Sejm, it would be difficult to argue that it authorizes the President of the Republic of Poland to refuse to accept the oath of office from those elected on March 13, 2026.

II Violation of the 7-day time limit running from the delivery of Sejm papers containing nominations for the Sejm’s selection of candidates

Under Article 30(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, putting to a vote motions regarding the Sejm’s election or appointment of individual persons to state offices may not take place earlier than the seventh day after the delivery to Deputies of the printed document containing the candidates, unless the Sejm decides otherwise.

Speaker of the Sejm Włodzimierz Czarzasty, amid general confusion and applause from coalition MPs for Prime Minister Donald Tusk[25], ordered the shortening of the aforementioned seven-day time limit under the Sejm’s no-objection procedure.[26]

It should be noted at this point that shortening the time limit in question is not without precedent. In 2015, the Speaker of the Sejm, Marek Kuchciński, also deemed adding to the agenda to be equivalent to shortening the time limit, but at that time, due to an objection raised in the Council of Elders, it was put to a vote on adding to the agenda.[27] However, in exactly the same procedure – lack of objection – Speaker Elżbieta Witek shortened the deadline on November 21, 2019,[28] as a result of which 3 judges were elected: Krystyna Pawłowicz, Stanisław Piotrowicz, and Jakub Stelina. In the case of the latter, the time limit referred to in Article 30(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm was also shortened:[29] On the same day, the candidacy of Professor Stelina was submitted, reviewed by the committee, and then voted on by the Sejm.[30]

It should be noted, however, that the shortening of terms of office carried out in 2015 and 2019 can be argued to have been justified by exceptional circumstances. In both cases, the terms of office of the incumbent judges expired (on December 2 and 8, 2015, and on December 3, 2019) after the commencement of the VIII (November 12, 2015) and IX (November 12, 2019) terms of the Sejm, respectively. Thus, the haste may have stemmed from a desire to make appointments before the terms of office of the incumbent Constitutional Tribunal (TK) judges expired and thereby ensure the Tribunal’s continuity of work—yet no such circumstance exists at present, since the Tribunal already has a significant number of vacancies—the shortest for about 3 months, the longest for over a year and 3 months[31].

At the same time, however, it should be noted that in 2019 observing the seven-day deadline would not have resulted in a vacancy—the last candidate, after all, was put forward on November 21, whereas the terms of the three judges did not expire until December 3, so there was still a five-day buffer. Meanwhile, in 2015, taking into account the deadline for submitting nominations (December 1, 2015[32]), only one of the 5 seats being filled at that time would have become vacant (on December 3) if the deadline had been met – the other 3 had already been vacant since November 7, 2015, and the last one did not become vacant until December 9, i.e., one day after that deadline expired.

In light of the foregoing, it should be stated that the conduct of the Speaker of the Sejm, Włodzimierz Czarzasty, although clearly contrary to good parliamentary customs, in this respect did not depart materially from prior Sejm practice.

III Failure to inform the Sejm of the committee’s positive opinion regarding one of the candidates.

On March 12, 2026, the Justice and Human Rights Committee of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland expressed opinions on all eight candidates nominated for six vacant seats on the Constitutional Tribunal (TK). The committee’s opinion was positive toward all the candidates who took part in the committee meeting – both the 6 who were nominated by the Presidium of the Sejm and ultimately elected as judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (TK) on March 13, and toward Attorney Michał Skwarzyński, Ph.D., nominated by deputies of the Law and Justice parliamentary group.[33]

Meanwhile, the rapporteur appointed by the Committee — MP Patryk Jaskulski — did not mention at all what the Committee’s opinion was of the candidacy of Michał Skwarzyński. He merely listed, one by one, the 6 candidates nominated by the Presidium of the Sejm, stating for each that the committee’s opinion was positive, except that for the last one — Maciej Taborowski — he added that “this candidate received a decidedly smaller number of votes than the other candidates” — a remark which in fact accurately describes Michał Skwarzyński, not Maciej Taborowski — after which he stated that the candidate Artur Kotowski received a negative opinion[34]. Subsequently, during the vote on his candidacy, Michał Skwarzyński secured only 172 votes in favor, with 253 against,[35] as a result of which he was not elected as a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal.

The conduct of the rapporteur MP was undoubtedly contrary to Article 43(7) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, under which the rapporteur MP may not, in their report, present any motions other than those contained in the committee’s report. However, it appears that the omission was most likely a mistake – in such a situation, the most justified course would have been a reconsideration of the vote, but this, due to the closure of the Sejm session, is no longer possible in light of Article 189(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm[36].

Conclusion

The Sejm is undoubtedly bound by its own Rules of Procedure, which the Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly emphasized – for example, in the judgment of July 14, 2020, case no. Kp 1/19[37]. This judgment also emphasized that any departure from the ordinary rules of the Rules of Procedure should take the form of a resolution[38]. It would follow from this that it cannot be held that the Sejm may resolve to shorten the deadlines by implication from its conduct. However, it is difficult to determine whether it can do so under the no-objection procedure—despite precedents in this regard, one must conclude that this is certainly contrary to good parliamentary practice.

The Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly indicated, however, including in particular in its judgment of March 23, 2006, case no. K 4/06,[39] that not every breach of the Rules of Procedure renders the procedure null and void. Of key importance, among other things, is whether the violation may concern “the observance, in the course of parliamentary proceedings, of the right of members of parliament to express, individually and collectively, their position on the draft.”[40] In the judgment of December 9, 2015, case no. K 35/15,[41] the move from the first to the second reading within a dozen or so hours was deemed a violation of such a right,[42] noting that failure to observe the usual seven-day time limit led to “doubts as to the possibility of properly preparing within that time for further proceedings.”[43]

It appears that the above concerns were reproduced almost exactly in the present case, but if so, they were also repeated in 2019, as noted above. 

It can therefore be argued that, on the one hand, the failure to put the issue of shortening the time limit to a vote, and thereby preventing discussion in this respect, violated the right of Members of Parliament to express their position individually and collectively. Conversely, proceeding at an accelerated pace without a vote to approve the shortening of the time limit may be deemed a deprivation of the opportunity to “duly prepare during that time for further proceedings.” Similarly, it can be argued that misleading the Sejm as to the Commission’s opinion—regardless of whether it resulted from a mistake or was deliberate—could have affected the Sejm’s proper preparation for subsequent proceedings.

At the same time, it should be noted, however, that it would be difficult to prove that either putting the question of shortening to a vote or presenting the committee’s full opinion at the plenary session could have altered the final outcome of the entire selection process. However, it should be borne in mind that, in such a situation, the Constitutional Tribunal would have been acting under different factual circumstances at the hearing scheduled for March 17 of this year concerning the constitutionality of the procedure for electing judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in case no. K 3/26,[44] than was the case in reality.

In light of practice to date, it is therefore not possible to determine unequivocally whether the election of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal (TK), conducted on March 13, was procedurally flawed under the provisions of the Sejm’s Rules of Procedure. With respect to Article 30(3)(1) and (4), it is debatable whether one can, in fact, speak outright of an infringement of the provisions, although there has undoubtedly been a breach of good practices and customs. However, the primary point of contention is whether the extent of these violations allows the election to be deemed invalid. Undoubtedly, however, it should be acknowledged that these infringements affected the right of members of parliament to express their position, individually and collectively, as articulated in particular in the judgment in case K 35/15.

Both in legal doctrine and in the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal, it is indicated that fundamental defects in the Sejm’s selection of nominees relate to violations on the level of voting by an unauthorized entity or selecting a person who does not meet the formal eligibility requirements to run for the office of judge of the Constitutional Tribunal.[45]

However, it should be borne in mind that, if the President determines that there have been violations of such magnitude as to preclude the acceptance of the oaths of office, the Sejm will have the authority to repeat the procedure and—within just over a week—select the candidates in a legally sound manner. As it happens, the renewed proceedings could take place after the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment in case K 3/26, which, as noted above, concerns the constitutionality of the current procedure for selecting judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. If the Constitutional Tribunal finds the current procedure incompatible with the Constitution, the Sejm will first be required to comply with the Tribunal’s judgment and adopt a new procedure that would be consistent with the Constitution. In such a situation, the most appropriate action on the part of the Sejm would be to refrain from conducting another election until the Constitutional Tribunal issues a judgment.

Recommendations

 Regardless of the above doubts, in light of the already mentioned Constitutional Tribunal judgment in case K 34/15[46] it would be most appropriate for the President to refrain from making a decision to accept the oath of office until the Constitutional Tribunal issues a judgment in case K 3/26. While at the same time complying with the request to submit his position in writing, expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal at the hearing held on March 17 of this year, the President of the Republic of Poland should clearly indicate the need for the Constitutional Tribunal, in the course of reviewing the conformity of Article 4(1) of the Act on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal with the Constitution, also to address the issue of whether this provision is consistent with the Constitution not only insofar as it imposes on the President of the Republic of Poland an obligation to receive the oath of office from a person elected by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in a manner and on terms whose legal basis the Constitutional Tribunal has held to be legally flawed, or despite a challenge to the provisions underlying the election to the Constitutional Tribunal before the Tribunal has delivered a final judgment, but also insofar as it imposes on the President an obligation to receive the oath of office in the event of an election potentially carried out in breach of procedures, including in particular those described in this analysis.

Having regard to Article 67 of the Act of 30 November 2016 on the organization and procedure before the Constitutional Tribunal,[47] pursuant to which the Tribunal, when adjudicating, is bound by the scope of the challenge indicated in the application, which, however, consists solely of identifying the contested normative act or part thereof (defining the subject of review) and formulating an allegation of inconsistency with the Constitution, a ratified international agreement, or a statute (indicating the standard of review), the resolution of the above doubts by the Constitutional Tribunal should be deemed admissible.

Alternative solution

An alternative solution is for the President of the Republic of Poland, pursuant to Article 189 in conjunction with Article 192 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, to seek a resolution of the competence dispute that has arisen between the President and the Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the interpretation of Article 144(3)(17) in conjunction with Article 194(1) of the Constitution—that is, concerning the scope of the President’s prerogative to appoint judges and the permissibility of refusing to accept the oath and thereby objecting to the appointment of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal after that judge’s election by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, as well as the grounds for such a refusal.

An assessment of the scope of the presidential prerogative to appoint judges, indicating the permissibility of refusing to appoint a judge who is the subject of a motion by the National Council of the Judiciary, was set out in the judgment of June 5, 2012, case no. K 18/09[48] with respect to judges of the common courts.[49] It appears that a different view with respect to judges of the Constitutional Tribunal was expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in case K 34/15, stating, on the one hand, that the President does not have the authority to refuse to accept the oath from a person elected as a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, while at the same time confirming the President’s right to extend the time for receiving the oath.[50] In view of the foregoing discrepancies, however, there is no clear jurisdictional determination, which only the Constitutional Tribunal is empowered to make under the constitutional order.

In the case of a special competence dispute that does not directly fit within the typical framework of a negative or positive dispute, the most appropriate course is to seek a ruling from the Constitutional Tribunal (TK), which, under the ideal conditions of a state governed by the rule of law, allows the dispute to be removed from the realm of political decision-making and enables the body established for that purpose to provide a binding interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.

Atty. Jerzy Kwaśniewski – President of the Ordo Iuris Institute

Jędrzej Jabłoński – senior analyst at the Ordo Iuris Institute

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[1] Hereinafter: the CT

[2] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 305.

[3] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 304.

[4] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 303.

[5] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 302.

[6] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 301.

[7] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of March 13, 2026, on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2026, item 300.

[8] Official Journal of 2018, item 1422, hereinafter: the Act on the Status of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.

[9] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 July 1992. Rules of Procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, M.P. of 2022, item 990, as amended, hereinafter: “Rules of Procedure of the Sejm.”

[10] With respect to the most recently vacated seat – following Michał Warciński – this deadline expired on November 20, 2025.

[11] Motions shall be submitted to the Speaker of the Sejm by the following deadline: […] as determined by the Speaker of the Sejm in the event that circumstances other than those specified in points 1-4 arise which necessitate holding an election.

[12] Election of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal. The Speaker announced an important date, March 9, 2026, https://www.tvp.info/91994416/do-11-marca-mozna-skladac-w-sejmie-wnioski-ws-wyboru-6-sedziow-do-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-decyzja-marszalka-wlodzimierza-czarzastego, accessed March 19, 2026.

[13] The Sejm elected only one Constitutional Tribunal judge, November 20, 2006, https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/96934/sejm-wybral-tylko-jednego-sedziego-tk.html, accessed March 19, 2026

[14] The second time, it was Bogusław Banaszak – Prof. Banaszak withdraws his candidacy for the Constitutional Tribunal, November 25, 2010, https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/prof-banaszak-rezygnuje-z-kandydowania-do-tk,34419.html accessed March 19, 2026. For the first – Kazimierz Barczyk – The Sejm did not elect a Constitutional Tribunal judge – the procedure starts over, March 4, 2010, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/twoje-prawo/artykuly/10830598,sejm-nie-wybral-sedziego-tk-procedura-rusza-od-nowa.html, accessed March 19, 2026.

[15] “The Tribunal held that Article 194(1) of the Constitution imposes an obligation on the Sejm of the term during which the office of a judge of the Tribunal became vacant to elect a judge of the Tribunal. […] Of course, it is possible that the Sejm will be unable to fill the post of a judge of the Tribunal due to various factual circumstances, such as a lack of support for the candidate or tight deadlines for conducting the selection procedure because of imminent parliamentary elections. […] In this context, it should be recalled that the continuity of the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal and the protection of the terms of office of the Tribunal’s judges are constitutionally protected and should serve as a point of reference for all state bodies involved in appointing to the office of judge of the Tribunal. Also constitutionally acceptable is a temporary vacancy in the composition of the Tribunal, provided, however, that it results from a combination of legitimate factual circumstances and not from a strategy or measure adopted by a state authority” [emphasis added] – judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 3, 2015, case no. K 34/15, Official Journal of 2015, item 2129.

[16] For example, in the case of Teresa Liszcz, who was elected on December 8, 2006, took the oath and assumed the duties of a judge on December 29, 2006, and whose term expired on December 8, 2015, or Sławomira Wronkowska-Jaśkiewicz, who was elected on May 6, 2010, took the oath and assumed the duties of a judge on May 17, 2010, and whose term expired on May 6, 2019.

[17] Such is the case with Mariusz Muszyński, who was elected on December 2, 2015, took the oath and assumed the duties of a judge on December 3, 2015, and whose term expired on December 3, 2024.

[18] “The oath taken before the President in accordance with Article 21(1) of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal is not merely a solemn ceremony of a symbolic nature; […] taking the oath allows the judge to begin holding office, that is, to perform the mandate entrusted to him.” – ibid.

[19] See, for example, the Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of October 27, 2006, on the election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2006 No. 80, item 792, which specified that the terms of office of the newly elected judges—Maria Gintowt-Jankowicz, Wojciech Hermeliński, and Marek Kotlinowski—begin on November 6, 2006, or the Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of November 26, 2010, on the election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2010 No. 93, item 1067, which specified that the terms of office of Stanisław Rymar, Piotr Tuleja, and Marek Zubik begin on December 3, 2010.

[20] Thus, for example, in the case of Teresa Liszcz, elected on December 8, 2006 to the seat vacant since December 3 of that year – Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of December 8, 2006 on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2006 No. 89 item 919; in the case of Sławomira Wronkowska-Jaśkiewicz, elected on May 6, 2010 to the seat vacant since March 3 of that year – Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of May 6, 2010 on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2010 No. 38 item 525; or in the case of Mariusz Muszyński, elected on December 2, 2015 to the seat vacant since November 7, 2015 – Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of December 2, 2015 on the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. 2015, item 1184.

[21] See M.P. of 1993 No. 62 item 557.

[22] “Members of the Constitutional Tribunal are elected for a term of eight years, with half of the membership elected every four years; re-election to the Tribunal is not permitted unless the previous election occurred mid-term for a period of less than four years.” – Article 15(4) of the Act of April 29, 1985, on the Constitutional Tribunal, Official Journal of 1991 No. 109, item 470.

[23] Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland dated November 13, 2001 regarding the election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2001 No. 42 item 672.

[24] Resolutions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of November 21, 2019 regarding the election of a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, M.P. of 2019, items 1132-1134.

[25] “I resume the sitting. The Committee on Justice and Human Rights presented opinions on the candidates for judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, parliamentary papers nos. 2344–2351. (Commotion in the chamber, applause) (Some members of parliament stand and chant: Donald Tusk! Donald Tusk! Donald Tusk!) (Some MPs chant: To Berlin! To Berlin! To Berlin!)” – Stenographic Record of the 53rd sitting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on March 13, 2026 (third day of proceedings), Warsaw 2026, https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter10.nsf/0/739080ED9F94F723C1258DB9006D02B6/%24File/53_c_ksiazka.pdf, p. 339, accessed March 19, 2026.

[26] “[…] I have decided to add to the agenda an item concerning the election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. I propose that, in these cases, the Sejm agree to shorten the time limit referred to in Article 30(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm. If I hear no objection, I will consider that the Sejm has adopted the proposal. I hear no objections” – ibid.

[27] “Groups of Members of Parliament submitted motions regarding the election of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal. The motions are document No. 56, the opinion is document No. 57. At the meeting of the Council of Seniors, an objection was raised to supplementing the agenda. This is […], pursuant to Article 173(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, a contested item on the agenda. I will put to a vote the proposal to add this item to the agenda. The adoption of the proposal to supplement the agenda will mean that the Sejm has consented to the application of Article 30(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm [emphasis added]. […] We will now proceed to the vote. […] Who among the Deputies is in favor of adding to the agenda an item worded as follows: Election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, documents Nos. 56 and 57, please raise your hand and press the button. Who is against? Who abstained? 441 members voted. 234 MPs voted in favor, 206 against, and 1 abstained. I declare that the Sejm has adopted the proposal.” – Stenographic Record of the 3rd sitting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on December 2, 2015., Warsaw 2015, https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter8.nsf/0/8FC52B5210DC349FC1257F10001F8889/%24File/03_ksiazka_bis.pdf pp. 8-9, accessed March 19, 2026.

[28] “Groups of deputies have submitted motions concerning the election of judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, contained in documents Nos. 16, 17, and 26. The opinions are forms Nos. 19 and 27. Accordingly, after obtaining a unified opinion of the Council of Seniors, I have decided to add an item to the agenda providing for the consideration of these motions. I propose that, in these cases, the Sejm decide to shorten the time limits set out in Article 30(4) and Article 30(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm. If I hear no objection, I will assume that the Sejm has adopted the proposal. “I hear no objection” – Stenographic Report of the 1st sitting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on November 21, 2019 (fourth day of proceedings), Warsaw 2019, https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter9.nsf/0/0198E90E7BCD4CBBC12584BA00172CB7/%24File/01_d_ksiazka_bis.pdf p. 224, accessed March 19, 2026.

[29] Consideration by the Sejm of the motion referred to in paragraph 1 may take place no earlier than the day following the day on which the document containing the committee’s opinion is delivered to the Deputies.

[30] See the course of the legislative process for Sejm paper No. 26 of the Eighth Term of the Sejm, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=26, accessed March 19, 2026.

[31] On December 3, 2024, the terms of office of Mariusz Muszyński and Piotr Pszczółkowski expired.

[32] See Sejm paper no. 56 of the 8th term of the Sejm – https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=56, accessed March 19, 2026.

[33] Opinion of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights concerning the motion to elect Mr. Michał Skwarzyński as a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, Sejm paper No. 2349, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/AE2817772AFDD6F4C1258DB800768F3E/%24File/2349.pdf, accessed March 19, 2026.

[34] “I hereby have the honor, on behalf of the Committee on Justice, to present the opinions concerning the individual candidates. The committee issued a positive opinion on the candidacy of Ms. Magdalena Bentkowska, document No. 2331. A favorable opinion was issued on the candidacy of Mr. Marcin Dziurda, paper no. 2332. It issued a favorable opinion on the candidacy of Ms. Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, document no. 2333. It issued a favorable opinion on the candidacy of Mr. Krystian Markiewicz, document no. 2335.  Mr. Dariusz Szostka also received a positive opinion, print no. 2337. (Deputy Joanna Borowiak: Probably Szostek.) Szostka. That’s what I said. If… (off-mic) I apologize to all of you. Mr. Maciej Taborowski also received a positive opinion from the committee. However, this candidate received significantly fewer votes than the other candidates. Unfortunately, candidate Artur Kotowski, whose candidacy received a negative recommendation, did not appear before the committee.  Thank you very much.” Stenographic Report of the 53rd Session…, p. 366.

[35] Vote No. 130 during the 53rd sitting of the Sejm on March 13, 2026 at 1:37:40 PM, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/Glosowanie.xsp?posiedzenie=53&glosowanie=130, accessed on March 19, 2026.

[36] A motion [for a revote] may be submitted only at the meeting at which the vote was held.

[37] “As already noted, by adopting the Rules of Procedure, the Sejm binds itself to the provisions of this legal act. Although members of parliament may change their rules of procedure at any time or adopt a new one, so long as it remains in force it must be strictly observed, and any invocation of the principle of autonomy cannot justify circumventing or failing to apply the provisions of the rules of procedure.” – judgment of July 14, 2020, case no. Kp 1/19, M.P. of 2020, item 647.

[38] “The Sejm may confer upon itself the authority to depart from the adopted procedures, both in the text of the Rules of Procedure themselves and, exceptionally, in the form of a resolution of a temporary nature. In this way, the Sejm may correct only narrow aspects of its Rules of Procedure, which is intended to eliminate procedural randomness and the creation of parallel Rules of Procedure that are simultaneously in force.”  – ibid.

[39] Official Journal of 2006, No. 51, item 377.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Official Journal of 2015, item 2147.

[42] In this case, a dozen or so hours elapsed between the first and second reading. The draft bill was not referred to a subcommittee, nor was it considered at several meetings of the committee, and moreover, no public hearing was scheduled. Indeed, only one meeting of the Legislative Committee was held, at which the first reading was conducted and the bill was analyzed following the first reading. Moreover, the first reading in this matter was held 5 days after the bill was received by the Speaker of the Sejm.  This means that, in this case, the committee declined to apply the safeguard rule arising from Article 37(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, under which the first reading should take place no earlier than on the seventh day following delivery to Members of the Sejm of the printed draft. The seven-day period is intended to allow lawmakers not only to review the draft’s content, but also to prepare for its consideration. In this case, the Sejm also dispensed with the second safeguard provision arising from Article 44(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, under which the second reading may take place no earlier than the seventh day after the committee’s report has been delivered to Members of the Sejm.” – ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See case file K 3/26, https://trybunal.gov.pl/sprawy-w-trybunale/art/zasady-i-trybu-wyboru-sedziego-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego, accessed March 19, 2026.

[45] “However, a situation justifying an extension of the time for administering the oath would have to be linked to an obvious and indisputable circumstance indicating that the Sejm did not adopt a resolution within the meaning of Article 120, second sentence, of the Constitution; that the person concerned lacks the legal capacity to assume judicial office; or that—already after the election—permanent and insurmountable obstacles emerged related to the judge’s previously unknown personal circumstances. Only after determining that, in the given case, one of these situations applies,” – judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 3, 2015… Cf.  Zieliński, M. J., The theoretical-legal aspects of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland declaring the 2015 election of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal to be without legal effect, “Przegląd Sądowy” 2017, No. 10, pp. 7–19.

[46] “An objection concerning the content of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal would have to be converted into a motion for the Constitutional Tribunal to examine that Act’s conformity with the Constitution. […] The occurrence of extraordinary circumstances may—under the conditions indicated above—lead to an extension of the period constituting the ‘necessary time’ for the performance of the obligation [to accept the oath]” – judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 3, 2015…

[47] Official Journal of 2019, item 2393.

[48] Official Journal of 2012, item 672.

[49] “In light of the prevailing views among legal scholars, there is no doubt that, although the President’s discretion is limited to taking a position on the candidate proposed by the KRS, the designation of the power to appoint judges as a prerogative underscores that the President has no legal obligation to grant the KRS’s request, while a refusal should occur only in extraordinary circumstances and would have to be preceded by the submission of objections to the KRS by the President’s representative serving on it […]. The President, as the supreme representative of the State and the guarantor of the continuity of state authority, shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the State’s sovereignty, as well as the inviolability and indivisibility of its territory, making use, in the performance of these tasks, of the powers set forth in the Constitution and statutes […]. An element of this mechanism is therefore also the proper exercise of the authority to appoint judges, which consists in expeditious action by the President within a period to act without undue delay, the length of which will, in each case, depend on the specific nomination proceedings. Such an interpretation allows for the possibility of a justified delay in the President’s exercise of his powers, which may arise, for example, from analyzing the candidacies submitted in the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), or from the need to suspend the nomination procedure due to disciplinary proceedings pending against the candidate concerned. Thus, it allows the President to properly exercise his prerogative, enabling him to make a sound assessment of the candidates presented in the motion submitted by the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS). It is consistent with the well-established view that the President’s role in the nomination procedure is not limited to that of a ‘notary’ confirming decisions made elsewhere […], but that he independently assesses the candidates presented to him and, consequently, may refuse to grant the KRS’s motion. He should be granted the right to refuse to comply with requests put forward, if in his view they would run counter to the values he has been appointed by the Constitution to safeguard […].

[50] “The Constitutional Tribunal recognizes that, in certain exceptional circumstances, situations may arise that will, objectively, require the President to protect a higher value – than the immediate fulfillment of the duty to accept the oath – namely the supremacy of the Constitution. […] In a particular case, a legitimate question may arise as to the need to balance values that are objectively contradictory and cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and as to which should take precedence. The occurrence of an extraordinary, objective, and indisputable situation that could not reasonably have been foreseen or prevented may, under the principle of safeguarding the supremacy of the Constitution, require specific action on the part of the President and justify extending the time for receiving the oath, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to resolve any doubts. […] The occurrence of extraordinary circumstances may – under the conditions indicated above – lead to an extension of the period counted toward the ‘necessary time’ for the performance of the obligation. However, this cannot serve as a basis for establishing authority to refuse to accept the oath. The Constitutional Tribunal rules out any interpretation of Article 21(1) of the Constitutional Tribunal Act that would give the President grounds to refuse to administer the oath to a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal elected by the Sejm.” – Constitutional Tribunal judgment dated December 3, 2015.

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